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Corruption and decentralized public governance

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  • Shah, Anwar

Abstract

This paper examines the conceptual and empirical basis of corruption and governance and concludes that decentralized local governance is conducive to reduced corruption in the long run. This is because localization helps to break the monopoly of power at the national level by bringing decisionmaking closer to people. Localization strengthens government accountability to citizens by involving citizens in monitoring government performance and demanding corrective actions. Localization as a means to making government responsive and accountable to people can help reduce corruption and improve service delivery. Efforts to improve service delivery usually force the authorities to address corruption and its causes. However, one must pay attention to the institutional environment and the risk of local capture by elites. In the institutional environments typical of some developing countries, when in a geographical area, feudal or industrial interests dominate and institutions of participation and accountability are weak or ineffective and political interference in local affairs is rampant, localization may increase opportunities for corruption. This suggests a pecking order of anticorruption policies and programs where the rule of law and citizen empowerment should be the first priority in any reform efforts. Localization in the absence of rule of law may not prove to be a potent remedy for combating corruption.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 3824.

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Date of creation: 01 Jan 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3824

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Related research

Keywords: National Governance; Governance Indicators; Corruption&Anitcorruption Law; Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures; Government Diagnostic Capacity Building;

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Tudorel ANDREI & Ani MATEI & Ion Gh. ROSCA, 2009. "The Corruption - An Economic and Social Analysis," Economics Books, The Economica Publishing House, edition 1, volume 1, number 03, December.
  2. Michael A. Nelson, 2012. "Corruption and the Size of Local Governments: Are They Related?," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1210, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
  3. Mohammad Reza Farzanegan & Tim Mennel, 2012. "Fiscal decentralization and Pollution: Institutions Matter," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201222, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  4. Rajeev K. Goel & Michael A. Nelson, 2010. "Decentralization of the Size and Scope of Local Governments and Corruption," Working Papers CEB 10-031, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  5. World Bank, 2012. "Implementation Strategy for Urban Water Supply Policy," World Bank Other Operational Studies 12644, The World Bank.
  6. Andreas Kyriacou & Oriol Roca sagalés, 2009. "Fiscal descentralization and the quality of government: evidence from panel data," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, vol. 189(2), pages 131-155, June.
  7. Andrei, Tudorel & Stancu, Stelian & Nedelcu, Monica & Matei, Ani, 2009. "Econometric Models used for the Corruption Analysis," MPRA Paper 19623, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Nadia Fiorino & Emma Galli & Fabio Padovano, 2012. "Do Fiscal Decentralization and Government Fragmentation Affect Corruption In Different Ways? Evidence from a Panel Data Analysis," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1217, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
  9. Andrei, Tudorel & Matei, Ani & Tusa, Erika & Nedelcu, Monica, 2009. "Characteristics of the Reforming Process in the Romanian Public Administration System," MPRA Paper 19017, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Feb 2009.
  10. Teodorescu, Daniel & Andrei, Tudorel & Rosca, Ion Gh. & Profiroiu, Marius & Turtureanu, Mihai, 2007. "Local Governance and Corruption of a Country in the Process of Joining the European Union," Journal for Economic Forecasting, Institute for Economic Forecasting, vol. 4(4), pages 49-60, December.
  11. Bobkova, Nina & Egbert, Henrik, 2012. "Corruption investigated in the lab: a survey of the experimental literature," MPRA Paper 38163, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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