The Causes of Corruption: Evidence from China
Abstract
In this study we explore in detail the causes of corruption in China using two different sets of data at the regional level (provinces and cities). We observe that regions with more anti-corruption efforts, histories of British rule, higher openness, more access to media and relatively higher wages of government employees are markedly less corrupt; while social heterogeneity, regulation, abundance of resource and state-owned enterprises substantially breed regional corruption. Moreover, fiscal decentralization is discovered to depress corruption significantly, while administrative decentralization fosters local corruption. We also find that there is currently a positive relationship between corruption and economic development in China that is mainly driven by the transition to a market economy.Download Info
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Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2010.72.Length:
Date of creation: Jun 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2010.72
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Keywords: Corruption; China; Government; Decentralization; Deterrence; Social Heterogeneity;Other versions of this item:
- Bin Dong & Benno Torgler, 2010. "The Causes of Corruption: Evidence from China," CREMA Working Paper Series 2010-07, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- Bin Dong & Benno Torgler, 2010. "The Causes of Corruption: Evidence from China," School of Economics and Finance Discussion Papers and Working Papers Series 257, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology.
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-07-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2010-07-24 (Development)
- NEP-POL-2010-07-24 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2010-07-24 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
- NEP-TRA-2010-07-24 (Transition Economics)
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Citations
Blog mentions
As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:- The Causes and Consequences of Corruption: Evidence from China
by Ariel Goldring in Free Market Mojo on 2010-05-14 12:07:09
Cited by:
- Cousin, Violaine, 2011. "中监为体、西监为用 or the specifics of Chinese bank regulation," MPRA Paper 36040, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Belousova, Veronika & Goel, Rajeev K. & Korhonen, Iikka, 2011.
"Causes of Corruption in Russia: A Disaggregated Analysis,"
BOFIT Discussion Papers
31/2011, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
- Belousova, Veronika & Rajeev, K. Goel & Korhonen, Iikka, 2011. "Causes of Corruption in Russia: A Disaggregated Analysis," Discussion Paper Series 557, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
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