This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Fiscal descentralization and the quality of government: evidence from panel data

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Andreas Kyriacou () (Universidad de Girona)
Oriol Roca sagalés () (Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In this paper we focus on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government quality. In a sample of 29 developing and developed countries over the period 1984-1997, fiscal decentralization has a positive effect on institutional quality but this effect diminishes as countries become wealthier. Moreover, the positive effect of fiscal decentralization on government quality is reduced by electoral and decision-making decentralization in poor and medium income countries whereas these forms of decentralization seem to improve the impact of fiscal decentralization on government quality in rich countries.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.ief.es/Publicaciones/Revistas/Hacienda%20Publica/189_fiscal.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Article provided by IEF in its journal Hacienda Pública Española/Revista de Economía Pública.

Volume (Year): 189 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 131-155
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:hpe:journl:y:2009:v:189:i:2:p:131-155

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Avda. Cardenal Herrera Oria, 378, 28035 Madrid
Phone: 91-339.89.15
Fax: 91-339.89.64
Email:
Web page: http://www.ief.es
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (José Manuel Tránchez).

Related research
Keywords: Quality of government; fiscal decentralization; political decentralization; panel data;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 1999. "The Quality of Government," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 222-79, April.
    Other versions:
  2. Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999. "Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker than Others?," NBER Working Papers 6564, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina V., 2000. "Incentives to provide local public goods: fiscal federalism, Russian style," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 337-368, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Van Rijckeghem, Caroline & Weder, Beatrice, 2001. "Bureaucratic corruption and the rate of temptation: do wages in the civil service affect corruption, and by how much?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 307-331, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1369-1401, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. AlÌcia Adserý, 2003. "Are You Being Served? Political Accountability and Quality of Government," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(2), pages 445-490, October.
    Other versions:
  7. Axel Dreher, 2006. "Power to the People? The Impact of Decentralization on Governance," KOF Working papers 06-121, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
  8. Hongbin Cai & Daniel Treisman, 2005. "Does Competition for Capital Discipline Governments? Decentralization, Globalization, and Public Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 817-830, June. [Downloadable!]
  9. Panizza, Ugo, 1999. "On the determinants of fiscal centralization: Theory and evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 97-139, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Enikolopov, Ruben & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2007. "Decentralization and political institutions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(11-12), pages 2261-2290, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Pranab Bardhan, 2002. "Decentralization of Governance and Development," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(4), pages 185-205, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta, 2002. "Decentralization and corruption: evidence across countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 325-345, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Pranab K. Bardhan & Dilip Mookherjee, 2000. "Capture and Governance at Local and National Levels," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 135-139, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta, 2002. " Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence from U.S. Federal Transfer Programs," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(1-2), pages 25-35, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Cai, Hongbin & Treisman, Daniel, 2004. "State corroding federalism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 819-843, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Treisman, Daniel, 2000. "The causes of corruption: a cross-national study," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 399-457, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. SALMON, Pierre, 1987. "Decentralization as an incentive scheme," Institut des Mathématiques Economiques – Document de travail de l’I.M.E. (1974-1993) 98, Institut des Mathématiques Economiques. LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS, Université de Bourgogne.
    Other versions:
  18. Salinas-Jimenez, M del Mar & Salinas-Jimenez, Javier, 2007. "Corruption, efficiency and productivity in OECD countries," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 903-915. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini & Francesco Trebbi, 2003. "Electoral Rules and Corruption," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 958-989, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  20. Arellano, Manuel, 2002. "Sargan's Instrumental Variables Estimation and the Generalized Method of Moments," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 20(4), pages 450-59, October.
  21. Qian, Yingyi & Roland, Gerard, 1998. "Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1143-62, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  22. Khaleghian, Peyvand, 2003. "Decentralization and public services : the case of immunization," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2989, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  23. Tabellini, Guido, 2000. "Constitutional Determinants of Government Spending," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  24. Shah, Anwar, 2006. "Corruption and decentralized public governance," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3824, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  25. Jorge Martínez-Vázquez & Robert M. McNab, . "Fiscal Decentralization, Macrostability And Growth," Working Papers 11-03 Classification-JEL , Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  26. Davoodi, Hamid & Zou, Heng-fu, 1998. "Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Study," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 244-257, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  27. repec:pal:imfstp:v:48:y:2001:i:4:p:8 is not listed on IDEAS
    Other versions:
  28. Keen, Michael & Marchand, Maurice, 1997. "Fiscal competition and the pattern of public spending," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 33-53, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  29. Matias Barenstein & Luiz de Mello, 2001. "Fiscal Decentralization and Governance: A Cross-Country Analysis," IMF Working Papers 01/71, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  30. Wallace E. Oates, 1999. "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(3), pages 1120-1149, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  31. Daniel Treisman, 2006. "Fiscal Decentralization, Governance, And Economic Performance: A Reconsideration," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 18(2), pages 219-235, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  32. Jin, Hehui & Qian, Yingyi & Weingast, Barry R., 2005. "Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese style," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1719-1742, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About 1000 archives contribute their bibliographic data to RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-26.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.