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Fiscal descentralization and the quality of government: evidence from panel data

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Author Info

  • Andreas Kyriacou

    ()
    (Universidad de Girona)

  • Oriol Roca sagalés

    ()
    (Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona)

Abstract

In this paper we focus on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government quality. In a sample of 29 developing and developed countries over the period 1984-1997, fiscal decentralization has a positive effect on institutional quality but this effect diminishes as countries become wealthier. Moreover, the positive effect of fiscal decentralization on government quality is reduced by electoral and decision-making decentralization in poor and medium income countries whereas these forms of decentralization seem to improve the impact of fiscal decentralization on government quality in rich countries.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by IEF in its journal Hacienda Pública Española/Revista de Economía Pública.

Volume (Year): 189 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 131-155

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Handle: RePEc:hpe:journl:y:2009:v:189:i:2:p:131-155

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Keywords: Quality of government; fiscal decentralization; political decentralization; panel data;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Bilin Neyapti, 2003. "Fiscal Decentralisation and Deficits: International Evidence," Working Papers 2003/2, Turkish Economic Association.
  2. Neyapti, Bilin, 2013. "Fiscal decentralization, fiscal rules and fiscal discipline," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(3), pages 528-532.

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