This paper surveys some recent literature on fiscal policy and comparative politics. Economic policy is viewed as the outcome of a game with multiple-principals and multiple-agents. Opportunistic politicians bargain over policy. Rational voters hold them accountable through retrospective voting. Political institutions determine the rules for legislative bargaining and for electing politicians to office. The questions asked are: how do alternative electoral rules and alternative regime types shape the size of government, the composition of spending, the performance of politicians in terms of effort or corruption, the features of electoral cycles. The paper discusses both theory and evidence, and concludes with some speculations about directions for future research.
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Paper provided by IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University in its series Working Papers with number
162.
Length: Date of creation: Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:igi:igierp:162
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002.
"Political economics and public finance,"
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Persson, Torsten & Roland , Gérard & Tabellini, Guido, 1997.
"Comparative Politics and Public Finance,"
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633, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Torsten Persson & Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, .
"Comparative Politics and Public Finance,"
Working Papers
114, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
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Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Jürgen von Hagen, 2005.
"Political Economy of Fiscal Institutions,"
Discussion Papers
149, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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