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Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

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Roger B. Myerson

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Abstract

A theoretical model is developed for predicting the relative effectiveness of different electoral systems for reducing government corruption. We consider voting games in which parties with known corruption levels and known positions on a major policy question are competing of legislative seats. We find that approval voting and proportional representation are fully effective, in the sense that all equilibria exclude corrupt parties from legislative seats. Plurality voting is partly effective, in the sense that there always exist some equilibria that exclude corrupt parties. Borda voting is ineffective because, for some political situations, no equilibria can guarantee the exclusion of corrupt parties.

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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 956.

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Date of creation: Sep 1991
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:956

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  1. Pande, Rohini, 2007. "Understanding Political Corruption in Low Income Countries," Working Paper Series rwp07-020, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government. [Downloadable!]
  2. Matias Iaryczower & Andrea Mattozzi, 2008. "Ideology and Competence in Alternative Electoral Systems," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002387, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Michele Polo, . "Electoral competition and political rents," Working Papers 144, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Kira Boerner & Christa Hainz, 2006. "The Political Economy of Corruption and the Role of Financial Institutions," Discussion Papers 135, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo, 2003. "The Effects of Constitutions on Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-037, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
  6. Stefano Gagliarducci & Tommaso Nannicini & Paolo Naticchioni, 2007. "Electoral Rules And Politicians' Behavior: A Micro Test," Working Papers wp2007_0716, CEMFI. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Witold J. Henisz & Bennet A. Zelner, 2004. "Interest Groups, Veto Points And Electricity Infrastructure Deployment," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2004-711, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Juan Carlos Berganza, 2000. "Politicians, voters and electoral processes: an overview," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 24(3), pages 501-543, September. [Downloadable!]
  9. Becker, Johannes & Peichl, Andreas & Rincke, Johannes, 2008. "Politicians' Outside Earnings and Electoral Competition," Discussion Papers in Economics 2206, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Aidt, T.S. & Dutta, J., 2004. "Policy Compromises: Corruption and Regulation in a Dynamic Democracy," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0404, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Eguia, Jon X., 2005. "Citizen candidates under uncertainty," Working Papers 1233, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Christian Bjørnskov & Axel Dreher & Justina A. V. Fischer, 2005. "The bigger the better? Evidence of the effect of government size on life satisfaction around the world," Economics working paper series 05/44, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Boerner, Kira & Hainz, Christa, 2005. "The Political Economy of Corruption and and the Role of Financial Institutions," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Kiel 2005 6, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics. [Downloadable!]
  14. Per G. Fredriksson & Muthukumara Mani & Richard Damania, 2003. "The Persistence of Corruption and Regulatory Compliance Failures: Theory and Evidence," IMF Working Papers 03/172, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Casey B. Mulligan & Kevin K. Tsui, 2008. "Political Entry, Public Policies, and the Economy," NBER Working Papers 13830, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Sven de Vries & Rakesh Vohra, 2000. "A Structural Model of Government Formation," Discussion Papers 1297, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  17. Tabellini, Guido, 2000. "Constitutional Determinants of Government Spending," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
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  18. Jean Hindriks & Ben Lockwood, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare," Working Papers 2006-02, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations. [Downloadable!]
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  19. Christian R. Ahlin, 1999. "Corruption: Political Determinants and Macroeconomic Effects," Working Papers 0126, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, revised Aug 2001. [Downloadable!]
  20. Caselli, Francesco & Morelli, Massimo, 2000. "Bad Politicians," CEPR Discussion Papers 2402, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  21. Evrenk, Haldun, 2008. "Mackerels in the Moonlight: A Duopoly Model of Political Agency," Working Papers 2008-4, Suffolk University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  22. Jimmy Torrez, 2002. "The effect of openness on corruption," Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 11(4), pages 387-403, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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