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Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare

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  • Jean Hindriks

    (Department of Economics, CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain)

  • Ben Lockwood

    ()
    (CEPR and Department of Economics, University of Warwick)

Abstract

This paper studies the relationship between fiscal decentralization and electoral accountability, by analyzing how decentralization impacts upon incentive and selection effects, and thus on voter welfare. The effect of fiscal centralization on voter welfare works through two channels: (i) via its effect on the probability of pooling by the bad incumbent; (ii) conditional on the probability of pooling, the extent to which, with centralization, the incumbent can divert rents in some regions without this being detected by voters in other regions (selective rent diversion). Both these effects depend on the information structure; whether voters only observe fiscal policy in their own region, in all regions, or an intermediate case with a uniform tax across all regions. More voter information does not necessarily raise voter welfare, and under some conditions, voter would choose uniform over differentiated taxes ex ante to constrain selective rent diversion.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations in its series Working Papers with number 2006-02.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ifr:wpaper:2006-02

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Keywords: fiscal federalism; decentralization; elections; accountability;

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References

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