Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Fiscal Decentralization: A Political Economy Perspective

Contents:

Author Info

  • Lockwood, Ben

    (University of Warwick and CEPR)

Abstract

This paper surveys recent contributions to the study of fiscal decentralization which adopt a political economy approach. It is argued that this approach can capture, in a variety of formal models, the plausible and influential ideas (increasingly, supported by empirical evidence) that fiscal decentralization can lead to improved preference-matching and accountability of government. In particular, recent work on centralized provision of public good provision via bargaining in a legislature shows how centralization reduces preference-matching, and recent work using "electoral agency" models formalizes the accountability argument. These models also provide insights into when decentralization may fail to deliver these benefits.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2008/twerp721.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 721.

as in new window
Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:721

Contact details of provider:
Postal: CV4 7AL COVENTRY
Phone: +44 (0) 2476 523202
Fax: +44 (0) 2476 523032
Web page: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Fiscal decentralization ; political economy ; local public goods;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Alesina, Alberto F & Angeloni, Ignazio & Etro, Federico, 2001. "The Political Economy of International Unions," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 3117, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Ben Lockwood, 2004. "Decentralization via Federal and Unitary Referenda," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 6(1), pages 79-108, 02.
  3. Etro, Federico & Ageloni, Ignazio & Alesina, Alberto, 2005. "International Unions," Scholarly Articles 4553008, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  4. Jeremy Edwards & Michael Keen, 1994. "Tax competition and Leviathon," IFS Working Papers, Institute for Fiscal Studies W94/07, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  5. Timothy Besley & Michael Smart, 2005. "Fiscal Restraints and Voter Welfare," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE 06, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  6. Paul Belleflamme & Jean Hindriks, 2001. "Yardstick Competition and Political Agency Problems," Working Papers, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance 441, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  7. Buchanan, James M., 1986. "The Constitution of Economic Policy," Nobel Prize in Economics documents, Nobel Prize Committee 1986-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
  8. Crémer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas, 1994. "In or Out?: Centralization by Majority Vote," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 33, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  9. J. Vernon Henderson & Ari Kuncoro, 2004. "Corruption in Indonesia," NBER Working Papers 10674, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Brian Knight, 2004. "Legislative Representation, Bargaining Power, and the Distribution of Federal Funds: Evidence from the U.S. Senate," NBER Working Papers 10385, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Alesina, Alberto & Spolaore, Enrico, 1997. "On the Number and Size of Nations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1027-56, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Barankay, Iwan & Lockwood, Ben, 2007. "Decentralization and the productive efficiency of government: Evidence from Swiss cantons," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 91(5-6), pages 1197-1218, June.
  2. Michela Redoano, 2007. "Does Centralization Affect the Number and Size of Lobbies?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1968, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Ricardo Alonso & Wouter Dessein & Niko Matouschek, 2008. "When Does Coordination Require Centralization?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 145-79, March.
  4. Paula Salinas & Albert Solé-Ollé, 2009. "Evaluating the effects of decentralization on educational outcomes in Spain," Working Papers 2009/10, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  5. Ligthart, J.E. & Rider, M. & Wang, R., 2013. "Does the Fiscal Decentralization Promote Public Safety? Evidence from United States," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2013-021, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  6. George Gelauff & Sjef Ederveen & J.L.M. Pelkmans, 2006. "Assessing subsidiarity," CPB Document, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 133, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
  7. Federico Etro, 2006. "Political geography," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 127(3), pages 321-343, June.
  8. Bård Harstad, 2007. "Harmonization and Side Payments in Political Cooperation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 871-889, June.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:721. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Helen Neal).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.