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Accountability and decentralisation in government: An incomplete contracts model

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Seabright, Paul
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 40 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 61-89
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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:40:y:1996:i:1:p:61-89

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  2. John William Hatfield & Gerard Padró i Miquel, 2009. "A Political Economy Theory of Partial Decentralization," NBER Working Papers 14628, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Santanu Gupta & Raghbendra Jha, 2006. "Local public goods in a democracy: Theory and evidence from rural India," Departmental Working Papers 2006-07, Australian National University, Economics RSPAS. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1997. "Ausgewählte Anwendungen der Theorie unvollständiger Verträge," MPRA Paper 6943, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  5. Tranchant, Jean-Pierre, 2007. "Decentralization and Ethnic Conflict: The Role of Empowerment," MPRA Paper 3713, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  6. Pranab K. Bardhan & Dilip Mookherjee, 2000. "Capture and Governance at Local and National Levels," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 135-139, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Jack, William, 2000. "Decentralizing the provision of health services : an incomplete contracts approach," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2395, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  8. Paula Salinas & Albert Solé-Ollé, 2009. "Evaluating the effects of decentralization on educational outcomes in Spain?," Working Papers 2009/10, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB). [Downloadable!]
  9. Jürgen von Hagen, 2002. "Fiscal Rules, Fiscal Institutions, and Fiscal Performance," The Economic and Social Review, Economic and Social Studies, vol. 33(3), pages 263-284. [Downloadable!]
  10. Lankina, Tomila, 2008. "Cross-Cutting Literature Review on the Drivers of Local Council Accountability and Performance," MPRA Paper 12408, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  11. Marcelin Joanis, 2009. "Intertwined Federalism: Accountability Problems under Partial Decentralization," CIRANO Working Papers 2009s-39, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Paula Salinas Pena & Albert Sole-Olle, 2009. "Evaluating the effects of decentralization on educational outcomes in Spain," Working Papers in Economics 228, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia. [Downloadable!]
  13. Sebastian Kessing, 2009. "Federalism and Accountability with Distorted Election Choices," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Susan Steiner, 2005. "Decentralisation and Poverty Reduction: A Conceptual Framework for the Economic Impact," GIGA Working Paper Series 03, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Antoni Castells & Alejandro Esteller & Maite Vilalta, 2004. "Full Characterisation of the Political Economy of Fiscal Adjustment: Evidence from Spanish Municipalities," Working Papers 2004/3, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB). [Downloadable!]
  16. Gurgur, Tugrul & Shah, Anwar, 2005. "Localization and corruption : panacea or pandora's box?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3486, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  17. Santhanu Gupta, 2007. "On the Relevance of the Median Voter to Resource Allocation amongst Jurisdictions," Working Papers id:1145, esocialsciences.com. [Downloadable!]
  18. Raghbendra Jha & Sambit Bhattacharyya & Raghav Gaiha & Shylashri Shankar, 2008. "Capture of Anti-Poverty Programs: An Analysis of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Program in India," ASARC Working Papers 2008-07, Australian National University, Australia South Asia Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
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