Regions of Europe : A Feasible Status, to be discussed
AbstractA new concept is proposed, that of "Regions of Europe", which do not have full statehood and belong not to any state but to the Community directly. Without endorsing this possibility, and limiting itself to its economic aspects, this article investigates in particular how assets and liabilities should be apportioned at the time of a secession. It argues in favour of distributive neutrality: net incomes are unchanged by the secession itself, in both the seceding region and the rest of the nation. How distributive neutrality could be implemented is explored through a number of suggestive examples. In general, a region receives a share of the public debt related to its share of the public primary deficit, with corrections to account for growth, unsustainability of the public debt, and so on.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1993037.
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