The Internal Organization of Government
AbstractThe paper discusses some specificities of the design of incentives in the public sector and their implications: multiplicity of goals, unclear weighing of these goals, and nonmeasurability of some of them; lack of comparison; heterogeneity of tastes and dispersion of principals. The paper then analyzes career concerns, associated with the prospect of reselection, promotion, or employment in the private sector, and articulated around some mission. There is a potential multiplicity of missions that can be followed by rational officials. The last part studies the division of labor within government, in particular division of labor among ministries and the use of multiple principals to control economic agents, and division of labor aimed at creating information for public decision making and the use of enfranchised advocates of specific interests. Copyright 1994 by Royal Economic Society.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Economic Papers.
Volume (Year): 46 (1994)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://oep.oupjournals.org/
Other versions of this item:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.