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Voting, Lobbying and the Decentralization Theorem

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Author Info
Ben Lockwood

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Abstract

This paper revisits the fiscal "decentralization theorem", by relaxing the role of the assumption that governments are benevolent, while retaining the assumption of policy uniformity. If instead, decisions are made by direct majority voting, (i) centralization can welfare-dominate decentralization even if there are no externalities and regions are heterogenous; (ii) decentralization can welfare-dominate centralization even if there are positive externalities and regions are homogenous. The intuition is that the insensitivity of majority voting to preference intensity interacts with the different inefficiencies in the two fiscal regimes to give second-best results. Similar results obtain when governments are benevolent, but subject to lobbying, because now decisions are too sensitive to the preferences of the organised group.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by European University Institute in its series Economics Working Papers with number ECO2007/06.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2007/06

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Related research
Keywords: Decentralization majority voting lobbying local public goods

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures

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