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In or Out?: Centralization by Majority Vote

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Author Info
Cremer, J.
Palfrey, T.R.

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Toulouse - GREMAQ in its series Papers with number 94.335.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 1994
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:gremaq:94.335

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Related research
Keywords: elections ; decision making;

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  1. Hendriks, Jean & Lockwood, Ben, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability : Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 729, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Gradstein, Mark, 2000. "The Political Economy of Sustainable Federations," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  3. Michele Ruta, 2003. "The allocation of competencies in an international union: a positive analysis," Working Paper Series 220, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
  4. John William Hatfield & Gerard Padró i Miquel, 2009. "A Political Economy Theory of Partial Decentralization," NBER Working Papers 14628, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Jon X. Eguia, 2006. "United We Vote," Working Papers 2006.9, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  6. Lockwood, Ben, 2005. "Fiscal Decentralization: A Political Economy Perspective," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 721, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Kjetil Bjorvatn & Alexander Cappelen, 2003. "Decentralization and the Fate of Minorities," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  8. Eguia, Jon X., 2004. "United We Vote," Working Papers 1208, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  9. Pani, Marco & Perroni, Carlo, 1999. "Time-Inconsistent Candidates vs. Time-Inconsistent Voters : Imperfect Policy Commitment in Political Equilibrium," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 544, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
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