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Federal Mandates by Popular Demand

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Author Info
Jacques Cremer
Thomas R. Palfrey

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Abstract

This paper proposes a new framework for studying federal mandates regarding public policies in areas such as environmental quality, public health, highway safety, and the provision of local public goods. Voters have single-peaked preferences along a single policy dimension. There are two levels of government, federal and local. The federal level can constrain local policy by mandating a minimum (or maximum) policy. Localities are free to adopt any policy satisfying the constraint imposed by the federal mandate. We show that voters choose federal mandates that are too strict, which leads to excessively severe mandates. We show that similar results can obtain when federal provision of the public-provided good is more efficient than local provision.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 108 (2000)
Issue (Month): 5 (October)
Pages: 905-927
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:108:y:2000:i:5:p:905-927

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  1. Bard Harstad, 2006. "Flexible Integration," Discussion Papers 1428, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  2. Nikitas Konstantinidis, 2007. "Gradualism and Uncertainty in International Union Formation," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  3. John William Hatfield & Gerard Padró i Miquel, 2009. "A Political Economy Theory of Partial Decentralization," NBER Working Papers 14628, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. repec:bep:eapcon:v:5:y:2006:i:1:p:1558-1558 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Kessler, Anke & Luelfesmann, Christoph & Myers, Gordon M, 2009. "The Architecture of Federations: Constitutions, Bargaining, and Moral Hazard," CEPR Discussion Papers 7244, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Martin Bodenstein & Heinrich Ursprung, 2005. "Political yardstick competition, economic integration, and constitutional choice in a federation:," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 329-352, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Gordon Rausser & Gerard Roland, 2008. "Special Interests Versus the Public Interest: The Determination of Policy Instruments," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series 1057, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
  8. Rausser, Gordon C. & Roland, Gerard, 2009. "Special Interests versus the Public Interest in Policy Determination," Agricultural Distortions Working Paper 50294, World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  9. Maria Gallego, David Scoones, 2005. "The Art of Compromise," Working Papers eg0042, Wilfrid Laurier University, Department of Economics, revised 2005. [Downloadable!]
  10. Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer, 2008. "Multi-National Policies for the Universal Service Obligation in the Postal Sector under Entry," Review of Network Economics, Concept Economics, vol. 7(2), pages 188-206, June. [Downloadable!]
  11. Stanley L. Winer & Michael W. Tofias & Bernard Grofman & John H. Aldrich, . "Is it Economics or Politics? Trending Economic Factors and the Structure of Congress in the Growth of Government, 1930-2002," Carleton Economic Papers 07-04, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised 28 Apr 2007. [Downloadable!]
  12. Hans Gersbach, 2001. "Competition of Politicians for Incentive Contracts and Elections," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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