This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Fiscal Federalism and Endogenous Lobbies' Formation

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Bordignon, Massimo
Colombo, Luca
Galmarini, Umberto

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We study lobbying behavior by firms in a two-region economy, with either centralized or decentralized provision of profit-enhancing local public goods. Firms compete either in the market, lobbying for public good provision once entered in a market, or for the market, lobbying to gain ccess to it. When firms compete in the market, we show that lobbying is unambiguously less disruptive or social welfare under decentralization. Moreover, foreign rather than domestic private nterests may be more powerful in a.ecting regional policies. On the contrary, when firms compete or the market, lobbying is mostly e.ective under decentralization, since local firms always end p forming a local monopoly. However, we show that an institutional setting in which competencies re split between the center and the periphery may dominate either full centralization or full ecentralization or both.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocCIDL/cesifo1_wp1017.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by CESifo GmbH in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number CESifo Working Paper No. 1017.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1017

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Poschingerstrasse 5, 81679 Munich
Phone: +49 (89) 9224-0
Fax: +49 (89) 985369
Web page: http://www.cesifo.de

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Julio Saavedra).

Related research
Keywords: fiscal federalism lobbying private interests

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 2001. "Lobbying and Welfare in a Representative Democracy," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 68(1), pages 67-82, January.
  2. de Melo, Jaime & Panagariya, Arvind & Rodrik, Dani, 1993. "The new regionalism : a country perspective," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1094, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Lockwood, Ben, 2002. "Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 69(2), pages 313-37, April.
    Other versions:
  4. Bolton, Patrick & Roland, Gerard & Spolaore, Enrico, 1996. "Economic theories of the break-up and integration of nations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 697-705, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Persson, Torsten, 1998. "Economic Policy and Special Interest Politics," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(447), pages 310-27, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Ma, Ching-To, 1988. "Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(4), pages 555-72, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Alberto Alesina & Ignazio Angeloni & Federico Etro, 2003. "International Unions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2001, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Alesina, Alberto F & Angeloni, Ignazio & Etro, Federico, 2003. "International Unions," CEPR Discussion Papers 3913, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Alberto Alesina & Enrico Spolaore & Romain Wacziarg, 2000. "Economic Integration and Political Disintegration," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1276-1296, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Michael J. Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2002. "Does Federalism Lead to Excessively High Taxes?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 363-370, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Devashish Mitra, 1999. "Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1116-1134, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 752-69, August.
  13. Massimo Bordignon & Paolo Manasse & Guido Tabellini, 2001. "Optimal Regional Redistribution under Asymmetric Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 709-723, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Felli, Leonhardo & Merlo, Antonio, 2000. "Endogenous Lobbying," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta, 2002. "Decentralization and corruption: evidence across countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 325-345, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  16. Mookherjee, Dilip, 1984. "Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(3), pages 433-46, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Michela Redoano, 2007. "Does Centralization Affect the Number and Size of Lobbies?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Luca Colombo & Herbert Dawid & Kordian Kabus, 2007. "When do Thick Venture Capital Markets Foster Innovation? An Evolutionary Analysis," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza ief0074, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE). [Downloadable!]
  2. Peter Tuchyòa & Martin Gregor, 2005. "Centralization Trade-off with Non-Uniform Taxes," Working Papers IES 81, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005. [Downloadable!]
  3. Hein Roelfsema, 2004. "Legislative Bargaining and Lobbying in the European Union," Working Papers 04-16, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Jean Hindriks & Ben Lockwood, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare," Working Papers 2006-02, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Stefano Colombo, 2008. "Discriminatory prices, endogenous locations and the Prisoner Dilemma problem," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza ief0079, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE). [Downloadable!]
  6. Iwan Barankay & Ben Lockwood, 2006. "Decentralization and the Productive Efficiency of Government: Evidence from Swiss Cantons," IZA Discussion Papers 2477, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Martin Gregor & Peter Tuchyňa, 2007. "Centralization Trade-off with Non-Uniform Taxation," AUCO Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 1(3), pages 223-253, November. [Downloadable!]
  8. Evgeny Yakovlev & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2006. "State Capture in a Federation," Working Papers w0093, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
  9. Michela Redoano, 2007. "Does Centralization Affect the Number and Size of Lobbies?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by encouraging others to use our services.

This page was last updated on 2008-9-22.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.