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International Unions

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Author Info
Alesina, Alberto F
Angeloni, Ignazio
Etro, Federico

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Abstract

We model an international union as a group of countries deciding together on the provision of public goods or policies that generate spillovers across members. The trade-off between benefits of coordination and loss of independent policy-making endogenously determines size, composition and scope of the union. Policy uniformity reduces the union’s size, may block enlargement processes and induce excessive centralization. We study flexible rules with non-uniform policies that reduce these inefficiencies focusing on arrangements relevant in the context of existing unions or federal states, like enhanced cooperation, subsidiarity, federal mandates and earmarked grants.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 3913.

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Date of creation: May 2003
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3913

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Related research
Keywords: european union; federalism; international unions; political economy;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Alesina, Alberto & Wacziarg, Romain, 1999. "Is Europe going too far?," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 1-42, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Alberto Alesina & Ignazio Angeloni & Federico Etro, 2001. "Institutional Rules for Federations," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1940, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Bard Harstad, 2006. "Flexible Integration," Discussion Papers 1428, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  2. Daniel Brou & Michele Ruta, 2004. "A Positive Explanation of EU Enlargement," Economics Working Papers ECO2004/30, European University Institute. [Downloadable!]
  3. Nikitas Konstantinidis, 2007. "Gradualism and Uncertainty in International Union Formation," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  4. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2004. "National Sovereignty in an Interdependent World," NBER Working Papers 10249, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Filippo Gregorini, 2007. "Political Geography and Income Inequalities," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Teoria Economica e Metodi Quantitativi itemq0746, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE). [Downloadable!]
  6. Daron Acemoglu & Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2008. "Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs," NBER Working Papers 14239, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Xavier Calsamiglia & Teresa Garcia-Milà & Therese J. McGuire, 2006. "Why do Differences in the Degree of Fiscal Decentralization Endure?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  8. repec:att:wimass:1920327 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Radax, Wolfgang, 2009. "The number and size of nations revisited: Endogenous border formation with non-uniform population distributions," MPRA Paper 15783, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  10. Floriana Cerniglia & Laura Pagani, 2007. "The European Union and the Member States: Which Level of Government Should Do what? An Empirical Analysis of Europeans’ Preferences," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  11. Le Breton, Michel & Makarov, Valery & Savvateev, Alexei & Weber, Shlomo, 2007. "Multiple Membership and Federal Structures," IDEI Working Papers 491, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  12. Federico Etro, 2006. "Political geography," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(3), pages 321-343, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Bordignon, Massimo & Colombo, Luca & Galmarini, Umberto, 2003. "Fiscal Federalism and Endogenous Lobbies' Formation," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  14. Giorgia Albertin, 2007. "Will a Regional Bloc Enlarge?," IMF Working Papers 07/69, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  15. Hans-Günter Krüsselberg, 2005. "Milton Friedman und der Wissenschaftliche Beirat für Familienfragen Elternkompetenz und Anteilscheine am Schulbudget – Gedanken über Reformpotenziale," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200506, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung). [Downloadable!]
  16. Floriana Cerniglia & Laura Pagani, 2007. "The allocation of competences between the European Union and the Member States: an analysis of the determinants of Europeans’ preferences," Working Papers 118, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised 2007. [Downloadable!]
  17. Bård Harstad, 2007. "Harmonization and Side Payments in Political Cooperation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 871-889, June. [Downloadable!]
  18. Paul De Grauwe & Francesco Paolo Mongelli, 2005. "Endogeneities of optimum currency areas - what brings countries sharing a single currency closer together?," Working Paper Series 468, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  19. Kimiko Terai, 2008. "Interregional Disparities in Productivity and the Choice of Fiscal Regime," Working Papers 070813, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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