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Author Info
Alberto Alesina
Ignazio Angeloni
Federico Etro

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Abstract

We study the organization of federations — or international unions — which decide together the provision of certain public goods. The benefit of centralization depends on the internalization of the spillovers, that of decentralization on the adaptability to local differences. We individuate as an optimal institutional design a form of fiscal federalism based on decentralization of expenditures and a system of subsidies and transfers between countries. Since this solution can be politically unfeasible, we study institutional compromises between a centralized federation and a decentralized one. “Flexible unions” and federal mandates in which both the state and federal levels are involved in providing public goods are typically superior to complete centralization and politically feasible. Finally, we study the effects of a qualified majority voting rule in a centralized system: we find that it can be a useful device to correct a bias toward “excessive” union level activism.

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Paper provided by Harvard - Institute of Economic Research in its series Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers with number 1940.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:fth:harver:1940

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Alberto Alesina & Ignazio Angeloni & Federico Etro, 2001. "The Political Economy of International Unions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1939, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Alberto Alesina & Romain Wacziarg, 1999. "Is Europe Going Too Far?," NBER Working Papers 6883, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Persson, Torsten & Roland, Gerard & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1163-1202, November.
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  4. Torsten Persson & Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 2000. "Comparative Politics and Public Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(6), pages 1121-1161, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Alberto Alesina & Ignazio Angeloni & Ludger Schuknecht, 2001. "What Does the European Union Do?," NBER Working Papers 8647, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 1998. "Subsidiarity and the European Union," NBER Working Papers 6556, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Alesina, Alberto & Wacziarg, Romain, 1998. "Openness, country size and government," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 305-321, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Alberto Alesina & Romain Wacziarg, 1997. "Openness, Country Size and the Government," NBER Working Papers 6024, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Wallace E. Oates, 1999. "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(3), pages 1120-1149, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Alberto Alesina & Ignazio Angeloni & Federico Etro, 2001. "The Political Economy of International Unions," NBER Working Papers 8645, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Robert A.J. Dur & Hein J. Roelfsema, 2002. "Why does Centralisation fail to internalise Policy Externalities?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 02-056/3, Tinbergen Institute, revised 11 Nov 2003. [Downloadable!]
  3. Islam, Roumeen, 2004. "What are the right institutions in a globalizing world? and... can we keep them if we have found them?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3448, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  4. Robert Dur & Hein Roelfsema, 2004. "Why does Centralisation Fail to Internalise Policy Externalities?," Working Papers 04-09, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Cheikbossian, G., 2004. "Lobbying and Rent-Seeking for Public Goods in a Fiscally Centralized System," Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) 2004.12, LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1. [Downloadable!]
  6. Alberto Alesina & Ignazio Angeloni & Ludger Schuknecht, 2005. "What does the European Union do?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(3), pages 275-319, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Facchini, Giovanni, 2002. "Why Join a Common Market? The Political Economy of International Factor Mobility in a Multi-country Setting," Working Papers 02-0121, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business. [Downloadable!]
  8. Attilio Gardini & Giuseppe Cavaliere & Luca Fanelli, 2006. "Risk sharing, avversione al rischio e stabilizzazione delle economie regionali in Italia," Quaderni di Dipartimento 0, Department of Statistics, University of Bologna. [Downloadable!]
  9. Massimo Bordignon & Sandro Brusco, 2003. "On Enhanced Cooperation," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Alberto Alesina & Ignazio Angeloni & Federico Etro, 2005. "International Unions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 602-615, June. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Facchini, Giovanni & Testa, Cecilia, 2008. "Who is Against a Common Market?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6847, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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