We construct a set of indicators to measure the policy-making role of the European Union (European Council, Parliament, Commission, Court of Justice, etc.), in a selected number of policy domains. Our goal is to examine the division of prerogatives between European institutions and national ones, in light of the implications of normative models and in relation to the preferences of European citizens. Our data confirm that the extent and the intensity of policy-making by the ED have increased sharply over the last 30 years. Such increase has taken place, at different speeds, and to different degrees, across policy domains. In recent times the areas that have expanded most are the most remote from the EEC's original mission of establishing a free market zone with common external trade policy. We conjecture that the resulting allocation may be partly inconsistent with normative criteria concerning the assignment of policies at different government levels, as laid out in the theoretical literature.
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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number
8647.
Length: Date of creation: Dec 2001 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8647
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Article
Alberto Alesina & Ignazio Angeloni & Ludger Schuknecht, 2005.
"What does the European Union do?,"
Public Choice,
Springer, vol. 123(3), pages 275-319, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper
Alberto Alesina & Ignazio Angeloni & Ludger Schuknecht, 2002.
"What Does the European Union Do?,"
EUI-RSCAS Working Papers
61, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
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Find related papers by JEL classification: H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Alberto Alesina & Romain Wacziarg, 1999.
"Is Europe Going Too Far?,"
NBER Working Papers
6883, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Other versions:
Alberto Alesina & Robert J. Barro & Silvana Tenreyro, 2002.
"Optimal Currency Areas,"
NBER Working Papers
9072, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Alberto Alesina & Robert J. Barro & Silvana Tenreyro, 2003.
"Optimal Currency Areas,"
NBER Chapters,
in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2002, Volume 17, pages 301-356
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!]
Philippe Aghion & Alberto Alesina & Francesco Trebbi, 2002.
"Endogenous Political Institutions,"
NBER Working Papers
9006, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Alberto Alesina & Robert J. Barro, 2000.
"Currency Unions,"
NBER Working Papers
7927, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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