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The Politics of Monetary Policy

In: Handbook of Monetary Economics

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  • Alesina, Alberto
  • Stella, Andrea

Abstract

In this paper we critically review the literature on the political economy of monetary policy, with an eye on the questions raised by the recent financial crisis. We begin with a discussion of rules versus discretion. We then examine the issue of the central bank's independence (CBI) both in normal times and in times of crisis. Then we review the literature of electoral manipulation of policies. Finally we address international institutional issues concerning the feasibility, optimality, and political sustainability of currency unions in which more than one country shares the same currency. A brief review of the Euro experience concludes the paper.

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Bibliographic Info

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This chapter was published in:

  • Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford (ed.), 2010. "Handbook of Monetary Economics," Handbook of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 3, number 3, January.
    This item is provided by Elsevier in its series Handbook of Monetary Economics with number 3-18.

    Handle: RePEc:eee:monchp:3-18

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/bookseriesdescription.cws_home/BS_HE/description

    Related research

    Keywords: Monetary Policy Rules; Central Bank Independence; Political Cycles; Currency Unions; The Euro;

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    Cited by:
    1. Jane Bogoev & Goran Petrevski & Bruno S. Sergi, 2012. "Investigating the Link Between Central Bank Independence and Inflation in Central and Eastern Europe," Eastern European Economics, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 50(4), pages 78-96, July.
    2. Dalla Pellegrina, L. & Masciandaro, D. & Pansini, R.V., 2013. "The central banker as prudential supervisor: Does independence matter?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 415-427.
    3. Reis, Ricardo, 2013. "Central Bank Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 9567, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Eugenio Gaiotti & Alessandro Secchi, 2012. "Monetary policy and fiscal dominance in Italy from the early 1970s to the adoption of the euro: a review," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 141, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    5. Georgios Karras, 2011. "From Hero to Zero? The Role of the Euro in the Current Crisis: Theory and some Empirical Evidence," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 300-314, August.
    6. Spahn, Peter, 2012. "Integration durch Währungsunion? Der Fall der Euro-Zone," FZID Discussion Papers 57-2012, University of Hohenheim, Center for Research on Innovation and Services (FZID).
    7. Dumitriu, Ramona & Stefanescu, Răzvan, 2013. "Decizii strategice ale politicii monetare
      [Strategic decisions of the Monetary Policy]
      ," MPRA Paper 51242, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 05 Nov 2013.
    8. Eugene N. White, 2011. "“To Establish a More Effective Supervision of Banking”: How the Birth of the Fed Altered Bank Supervision," NBER Working Papers 16825, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Ferré Carracedo, Montserrat & Manzano, Carolina, 2011. "Designing the Optimal Conservativeness of the Central Bank," Working Papers 2072/179623, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    10. Jagoda Anna Kaszowska & Tomás Mancha Navarro & Juan Luis Santos, 2014. "Institutional and regulatory changes in the financial markets after the crisis emergence (2007-09)," Working Papers 02/14, Instituto Universitario de Análisis Económico y Social.
    11. Poomjai Nacaskul & Kritchaya Janjaroen & Suparit Suwanik, 2012. "Economic Rationales for Central Banking: Historical Evolution, Policy Space, Institutional Integrity, and Paradigm Challenges," Working Papers 2012-04, Economic Research Department, Bank of Thailand.
    12. Ferré Carracedo, Montserrat & García Fortuny, Judit & Manzano, Carolina, 2013. "The Conservativeness of the Central Bank when Institutional Quality is Poor," Working Papers 2072/222198, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    13. Santos Silva, J.M.C & Tenreyro, Silvana, 2010. "Currency Unions in Prospect and Retrospect," CEPR Discussion Papers 7824, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Peter Tillmann, 2011. "Cross-Checking Optimal Monetary Policy with Information from the Taylor Rule," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201132, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    15. Goran Petrevski & Jane Bogoev & Bruno S. Sergi, 2012. "The link between central bank independence and inflation in Central and Eastern Europe: are the results sensitive to endogeneity issue omitted dynamics and subjectivity bias?," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 34(4), pages 611-652, July.
    16. Pasquale Foresti, 2012. "Rules Versus Discretion Under Asymmetric Shocks," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(2), pages 1180-1190.

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