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Measuring Central Bank Independence: A Tale of Subjectivity and of Its Consequences

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Author Info
Mangano, Gabriel
Abstract

This paper first scrutinizes the two indices of central bank independence (CBI) most commonly used in the empirical literature. It defines and discovers an impressive interpretation spread, a major criteria spread but a negligible weighting spread in those indices. Second, it examines the robustness of the empirical 'common knowledge' on the benefits of CBI. It finds that, when rankings produced by various CBI indices are regressed with, among others, average inflation, 87.5 percent of the regression coefficients are not statistically significant. Third, following recent theoretical developments, it suggests an alternative approach to the measurement of a central bank's operational status. Copyright 1998 by Royal Economic Society.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Economic Papers.

Volume (Year): 50 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 468-92
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Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:50:y:1998:i:3:p:468-92

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  1. Bernd Hayo & Carsten Hefeker, 2001. "Do We Really Need Central Bank Independence? A Critical Re- examination," Macroeconomics 0103006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  2. Miguel Rueda, 2008. "Breaking Credibility in Monetary Policy: The Role of Politics in the Stability of the Central Banker," RES Working Papers 4585, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  3. JoAnne Morris & Tonny Lybek, 2004. "Central Bank Governance: A Survey of Boards and Management," IMF Working Papers 04/226, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  4. James Forder, 2002. "Interests and 'Independence': the European Central Bank and the theory of bureaucracy," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 16(1), pages 51-69, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. PANAGIOTIDIS, Theodore & TRIAMPELLA, Afroditi, 2006. "Central Bank Independence and inflation: the case of Greece," REVISTA DE ECONOMÍA DEL ROSARIO, UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO - FACULTAD DE ECONOMÍA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Hasan , Iftekhar & Mester, Loretta, 2008. "Central bank institutional structure and effective central banking: cross-country empirical evidence," Research Discussion Papers 29/2008, Bank of Finland. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Eva Gutierrez, 2003. "Inflation Performance and Constitutional Central Bank Independence: Evidence From Latin America and the Caribbean," IMF Working Papers 03/53, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  8. Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm & Jakob de Haan, 2007. "Does High Inflation Cause Central Bankers to Lose their Job? Evidence Based on a New Data Set," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Miguel Rueda, 2008. "Credibilidad en la política monetaria: Papel de políticas en la estabilidad del Presidente del Banco Central," RES Working Papers 4586, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  10. Aleksandra Maslowska, 2007. "Discussion on the Inconsistency of Central Bank Independence Measures," Discussion Papers 21, Aboa Centre for Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Dvorsky, Sandra, 2000. "Measuring Central Bank Independence in Selected Transition Countries and the Disinflation Process," BOFIT Discussion Papers 13/2000, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition. [Downloadable!]
  12. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & Pablo Querubin & James A. Robinson, 2008. "When Does Policy Reform Work? The Case of Central Bank Independence," NBER Working Papers 14033, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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