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Electoral and Partisan Cycles in Fiscal Policy: an Examination of Canadian Provinces

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Author Info
Kneebone, R.D.
McKenzie, K.J.

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Abstract

This paper investigates the presence of electoral and partisan cycles in the fiscal policy of Canadian provinces. We find strong evidence of electoral cycles in the form of large differences in the average change in the discretionary primary deficit between election and non-election years.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Calgary - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number 98-06.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:calgar:98-06

Contact details of provider:
Postal: THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, 2500 UNIVERSITY DRIVE N.W. CALGARY ALBERTA CANADA T2N 1N4.
Phone: (403) 220-5857
Fax: (403) 282-5262
Web page: http://econ.ucalgary.ca/
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Related research
Keywords: FISCAL POLICY ; ELECTIONS ; GOVERNMENT;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Von Hagen, J., 1992. "Budgeting Procedures and Fiscal Performance in the European Communities," European Economy - Economic Papers 96, Commission of the EC, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN).
  2. Alesina, Alberto F & Cohen, Gerald D & Roubini, Nouriel, 1992. "Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Democracies," CEPR Discussion Papers 608, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Kenneth Rogoff, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," NBER Working Papers 2428, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Nordhaus, William D, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(2), pages 169-90, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Breusch, T S & Pagan, A R, 1980. "The Lagrange Multiplier Test and Its Applications to Model Specification in Econometrics," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(1), pages 239-53, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Roubini, Nouriel & Sachs, Jeffrey D., 1989. "Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the industrial democracies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 903-933, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Konstantinos Angelopoulos & George Economides & Pantelis Kammas, 2009. "Do political incentives matter for tax policies? Ideology, opportunism and the tax structure," Working Papers 2009_12, Department of Economics, University of Glasgow. [Downloadable!]
  2. Marco Bonomo & Cristina Terra, 2008. "Political Business Cycles through Lobbying," THEMA Working Papers 2008-18, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
  3. Ferris, J.S. & Park, S. & Winer, S.L., 2007. "Studying the Role of Political Competition in the Evolution of Government Size Over Long Horizons," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0774, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Marcela Eslava, 2006. "The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy: Survey," RES Working Papers 4487, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  5. Dahlberg, Matz & Mörk, Eva, 2008. "Is there an election cycle in public employment? Separating time effects from election year effects," Working Paper Series 2008:3, IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Stephen Ferris & Marcel Voia, 2008. "What determines the length of a typical Canadian parliamentary government?," Carleton Economic Papers 08-06, Carleton University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Bonomo, Marco Antônio Cesar & Terra, Maria Cristina T., 2005. "Special Interests and Political Business Cycles," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 597, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
  8. J Stephen Ferris & Soo-Bin ParkFF & Stanley L. Winer, 2006. "Political Competition and Convergence to Fundamentals: With Application to the Political Business Cycle and the Size of Government," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  9. Allan Drazen & Marcela Eslava, 2006. "Pork Barrel Cycles," NBER Working Papers 12190, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Allan Drazen & Marcela Eslava, 2005. "Electoral Manipulation via Expenditure Composition: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 11085, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Picci, Lucio & Golden, Miriam, 2007. "Pork Barrel Politics in Postwar Italy, 1953–1994," MPRA Paper 5626, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. J. Stephen Ferris & Soo-Bin Park & Stanley L. Winer, 2005. "Political Competition and Convergence to Fundamentals: With Application to the Politcal Business Cycle and the Size of the Public Sector," Carleton Economic Papers 05-09, Carleton University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-20.


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