Checks and Balances on Political Budget Cycles: Cross-Country Evidence
AbstractPrevious empirical work on political budget cycles (PBCs) implicitly assumes the executive has full discretion over fiscal policy. Instead, we ask what happens when legislative checks and balances limit executive discretion. We find that legislative checks and balances moderate PBCs in countries with high compliance with the law. More effective checks and balances help to explain why cycles are weaker in developed countries and in established democracies. When the discretional component of executive power is isolated, there are significant cycles in all democracies. Copyright 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Kyklos.
Volume (Year): 62 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (08)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0023-5962
Other versions of this item:
- Jorge Streb & Daniel Lema & Gustavo Torrens, 2005. "Discretional political budget cycles and separation of powers," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 286, Universidad del CEMA.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
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