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Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young Democracy Setting

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Author Info
Akhmed Akhmedov () (Center for Economic and Financial Research)
Ekaterina Zhuravskaya () (Center for Economic and Financial Research)

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Abstract

This paper tests the theory of opportunistic cycles in a decade-old democracy–Russia–finds strong evidence of cycles, and provides an explanation for why previous literature often found weaker evidence. Using regional monthly panel data, we find that: (1) the budget cycle is sizable and short-lived; public spending shifts towards direct monetary transfers to voters; (2) the magnitude of the cycle decreases with democracy, government transparency, media freedom, voter awareness, and over time; and (3) pre-electoral manipulation increases incumbents’ chances for reelection. The short length of the cycle explains underestimation of its size by previous literature because of low frequency data used in previous studies.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science in its series Economics Working Papers with number 0047.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ads:wpaper:0047

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Related research
Keywords: Opportunistic Political Cycles; Maturity of Democracy; Russia; Fiscal Policy; Government Transparency;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
P35 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Public Finance
P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles

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