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Soft budget constraint theories: From centralization to the market

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Author Info
Eric Maskin
Chenggang Xu

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Article provided by The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in its journal Economics of Transition.

Volume (Year): 9 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 1-27
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Handle: RePEc:bla:etrans:v:9:y:2001:i:1:p:1-27

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Perotti, E. C., 1998. "Inertial credit and opportunistic arrears in transition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(9), pages 1703-1725, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Dewatripont, Mathias & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 1027-54, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Berglöf, Erik & Roland, Gérard, 1995. "Bank Restructuring and Soft Budget Constraints in Financial Transition," CEPR Discussion Papers 1250, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. J. Kornai, . "Legal Obligation, Non-Compliance and Soft Budget Constraint," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki".
  5. Chong-En Bai & Yijiang Wang, 1999. "The Myth of the East Asian Miracle: The Macroeconomic Implications of Soft Budgets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(2), pages 432-437, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-58, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Qian, Yingyi & Xu, Chenggang, 1998. "Innovation and Bureaucracy under Soft and Hard Budget Constraints," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 65(1), pages 151-64, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Qian, Yingyi & Roland, Gerard, 1998. "Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1143-62, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Berglof, Erik & von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, 1994. "Short-Term versus Long-Term Interests: Capital Structure with Multiple Investors," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 1055-84, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 1996. "Interbank lending and systemic risk," Proceedings, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), pages 733-765.
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  11. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Schaffer, Mark E., 1989. "The credible-commitment problem in the center-enterprise relationship," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 359-382, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Berglof, Erik & Roland, Gerard, 1997. "Soft budget constraints and credit crunches in financial transition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 807-817, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Wang, Yijiang, 1991. "Economic reform, fixed capital investment expansion, and inflation: A behavioral model based on the Chinese experience," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 3-27. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Ilya R. Segal, 1998. "Monopoly and Soft Budget Constraint," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(3), pages 596-609, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Prell, Mark A., 1996. "The Two Kornai Effects," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 267-276, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Huang, Haizhou & Xu, Chenggang, 1999. "Financial institutions and the financial crisis in East Asia," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 903-914, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Haizhou Huang & Chenggang Xu, 1999. "Financial Institutions, Financial Contagion, and Financial Crises," CID Working Papers 21, Center for International Development at Harvard University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  19. Dewatripont, M & Maskin, E, 1995. "Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 62(4), pages 541-55, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Mitchell, Janet, 1998. "Strategic Creditor Passivity, Regulation and Bank Bailouts," CEPR Discussion Papers 1780, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Maskin, Eric S., 1996. "Theories of the soft budget-constraint," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 125-133, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Haizhou Huang & Chenggang Xu, 1999. "Institutions, Innovations, and Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(2), pages 438-443, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  23. Goldfeld, Stephen M. & Quandt, Richard E., 1988. "Budget constraints, bailouts, and the firm under central planning," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 502-520, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Schmidt, Klaus M., 1996. "Incomplete contracts and privatization," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 569-579, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  25. Freixas, Xavier & Guesnerie, Roger & Tirole, Jean, 1985. "Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(2), pages 173-91, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  26. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1995. "Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 567-85, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  27. Kornai, J, 1979. "Resource-Constrained versus Demand-Constrained Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(4), pages 801-19, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  28. Janet Mitchell, 1999. "Theories of Soft Budget Constraints and the Analysis of Banking Crises," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 233, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
  29. Li, D.D., 1992. "Public Ownership as a Sufficient Condition for the Soft Budget Constraint," Papers 93-07, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
  30. Li, David D., 1998. "Insider control and the soft budget constraint: a simple theory," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 307-311, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  31. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  32. Aghion, Philippe & Howitt, Peter, 1992. "A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(2), pages 323-51, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  33. Goldfeld, Stephen M. & Quandt, Richard E., 1990. "Output targets, the soft budget constraint and the firm under central planning," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 205-222, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  34. Xavier Freixas, 1999. "Optimal Bail Out Policy, Conditionality and Creative Ambiguity," FMG Discussion Papers dp327, Financial Markets Group. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  35. Eric S. Maskin, 1999. "Recent Theoretical Work on the Soft Budget Constraint," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(2), pages 421-425, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  36. Loren Brandt & Xiaodong Zhu, 2000. "Redistribution in a Decentralized Economy: Growth and Inflation in China under Reform," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(2), pages 422-451, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  37. Romer, Paul M, 1990. "Endogenous Technological Change," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(5), pages S71-102, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  38. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1988. "On the mechanics of economic development," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 3-42, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  39. Goodhart, Charles & Schoenmaker, Dirk, 1995. "Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision Be Separated?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(4), pages 539-60, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Jian Tong & Chenggang Xu, 2004. "Financial Institutions and The Wealth of Nations: Tales of Development," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series /2004/469, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Janos Kornai & Eric Maskin & Gerard Roland, 2002. "Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint," Economics Working Papers 0019, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Konstantin Sonin & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2006. "Are Russian commercial courts biased? Evidence from a natural bankruptcy experiment," PSE Working Papers 2006-30, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Konstantin Sonin & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2007. "Are Russian Commercial Courts Biased? Evidence from a Bankruptcy Law Transplant," Working Papers w0099, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Lars-Hendrik Roeller & Zhentang Zhang, 2003. "Provision of Social Goods and Soft Budget Constraints," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 360, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  6. Akhmed Akhmedov & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2003. "Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young Democracy Setting," Working Papers w0024, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. David A. Hennessy & Donald Lien, 2003. "Ledger Provision in Hog Marketing Contracts," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 03-wp336, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Karel Janda, 2004. "Bankruptcy Procedures with Ex Post Moral Hazard," Working Papers IES 61, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2004. [Downloadable!]
  9. Guido Friebel & Sergei Guriev, 2000. "Should I Stay or Can I Go? Worker Attachment in Russia," Working Papers w0008, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
  10. Koen Schoors & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "Passive Creditors," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp737, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Bertero, Elisabetta & Rondi, Laura, 2002. "Hardening a Soft Budget Constraint Through 'Upward Devolution' to a Supranational Institution: The Case of Italian State-Owned Firms and the European Union," Working Papers UNU-WIDER Research Paper , World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER). [Downloadable!]
  12. Jiahua Che, 2000. "Decentralized Financing, Centralized Financing and the Dual Track System: Toward a New Theory of Soft Budget Constraints," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 261, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
  13. Akhmedov Akhmed & Orlov Evgeniy, 2004. "Can Government Paternalism Prevent Credit Market Failure?," EERC Working Paper Series 04-02e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS. [Downloadable!]
  14. Frederic Chabellard, 2001. "Dollarization of Liabilities in Non-tradable Goods Sector," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 380, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
  15. Ela Glowicka, 2006. "Effectiveness of Bailouts in the EU," CIG Working Papers SP II 2006-05, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Ela Glowicka, 2006. "Effectiveness of bailouts in the EU," Discussion Papers 176, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  16. Alexei Deviatov & Barry W. Ickes, 2005. "Reputation and the Soft-Budget Constraint," Working Papers w0078, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
  17. Herbert Brücker & Philipp J. H. Schröder & Christian Weise, 2003. "Can EU Conditionality Remedy Soft Budget Constraints in Transition Countries?," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 375, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. Nan-Kuang Chen & Hsiao-Lei Chu, 2003. "Collateral Value and Forbearance Lending," CEP Discussion Papers dp0603, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  19. Xiaokai Yang, 2000. "Incomplete Contingent Labor Contract, Asymmetric Residual Rights and Authority, and the Theory of the Firm," CID Working Papers 45, Center for International Development at Harvard University. [Downloadable!]
  20. Ponomareva, Maria & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2004. "Federal Tax Arrears in Russia: Liquidity Problems, Federal Redistribution or Russian Resistance?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4267, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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