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Endogenous Elections, Electoral Budget Cycles and Canadian Provincial Governments

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  • Reid, Bradford G
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    Abstract

    The existence of manipulative electoral budget cycles and opportunistic election setting is examined in the framework of a parliamentary democracy. Empirical tests are conducted using a pooled time series cross section data set derived from Canadian provincial governments over the 1962-92 period. Evidence in support of the electoral budget cycle hypothesis, but not the opportunistic election timing hypothesis, is obtained. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

    Volume (Year): 97 (1998)
    Issue (Month): 1-2 (October)
    Pages: 35-48

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:97:y:1998:i:1-2:p:35-48

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    Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

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    Cited by:
    1. Matz Dahlberg & Eva Mörk, 2011. "Is There an Election Cycle in Public Employment? Separating Time Effects from Election Year Effects," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 57(3), pages 480-498, September.
    2. Allers, Maarten & de Haan, Jakob & Sterks, Cees, 2001. " Partisan Influence on the Local Tax Burden in the Netherlands," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 106(3-4), pages 351-63, March.
    3. Ferris, J.S. & Park, S. & Winer, S.L., 2007. "Studying the Role of Political Competition in the Evolution of Government Size Over Long Horizons," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0774, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    4. Martinez, Leonardo, 2009. "A theory of political cycles," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1166-1186, May.
    5. Georgios Efthyvoulou, 2010. "Political Budget Cycles in the European Union and the Impact of Political Pressures: A dynamic panel regression analysis," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 1002, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
    6. Mechtel, Mario & Potrafke, Niklas, 2013. "Electoral cycles in active labor market policies," Munich Reprints in Economics 19249, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    7. Pettersson Lidbom, Per, 2003. "A Test of the Rational Electoral-Cycle Hypothesis," Research Papers in Economics 2003:16, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
    8. J. Stephen Ferris & Soo-Bin Park & Stanley L. Winer, 2005. "Political Competition and Convergence to Fundamentals: With Application to the Politcal Business Cycle and the Size of the Public Sector," Carleton Economic Papers 05-09, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
    9. Maria Teresa Balaguer-Coll & María Isabel Brun-Martos & Anabel Forte & Emili Tortosa-Ausina, 2014. "Determinants of local governments'­ reelection: New evidence based on a Bayesian approach," Working Papers 2014/06, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
    10. Voia, Marcel-Cristian & Ferris, J. Stephen, 2013. "Do business cycle peaks predict election calls in Canada?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 102-118.
    11. Bove, Vincenzo & Efthyvoulou, Georgios, 2013. "Political Cycles in Public Expenditure: Butter vs Guns," NEPS Working Papers 7/2013, Network of European Peace Scientists.
    12. J Stephen Ferris & Soo-Bin Park & Stanley L. Winer, 2006. "Political Competition and Convergence to Fundamentals: With Application to the Political Business Cycle and the Size of Government," CESifo Working Paper Series 1646, CESifo Group Munich.
    13. Margarita Katsimi & Vassilis Sarantides, 2012. "Do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy in developed, established democracies?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 325-362, April.

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