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Estabilización económica e incentivos políticos

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  • Jorge M. Streb

Abstract

Se reseñan los ciclos electorales en el producto (political business cycles) que son generados por políticos oportunistas que quieren ganar elecciones vía la manipulación de la política monetaria. El hilo argumental arranca con la contribución original de Nordhaus (1975), con agentes miopes que tienen expectativas adaptativas, y la crítica que sufre desde las expectativas racionales. Se discute luego la incorporación de información incompleta en Persson y Tabellini (1990), donde interpretan los ciclos como una señal bajo información asimétrica. Lohmann (1998) luego aísla un problema más básico, la falta de credibilidad de la política discrecional en años electorales, que se agrega al sesgo inflacionario usual en el modelo de Barro y Gordon (1983). A partir de Stein y Streb (2004), se discute también las consecuencias de información incompleta no sólo sobre idoneidad sino sobre oportunismo, que lleva a un problema de selección adversa.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Universidad del CEMA in its series CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. with number 461.

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Length: 72 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cem:doctra:461

Note: E3, E5
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Keywords: ciclos electorales en el producto; políticos oportunistas; expectativas adaptativas; expectativas racionales; información incompleta; señales; credibilidad;

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References

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  1. Alejandro Saporiti & Jorge Streb, 2008. "Separation of powers and political budget cycles," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 329-345, October.
  2. Bonomo, Marco Antônio Cesar & Terra, Maria Cristina T., 2001. "Elections and Exchange Rate Policy Cycles," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 435, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  3. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1981. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model," NBER Working Papers 0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Calvo, Guillermo A, 1978. "On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1411-28, November.
  5. Kenneth Rogoff, 1987. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," NBER Working Papers 2428, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Robert J. MacCulloch & Rafael Di Tella & Andrew J. Oswald, 2001. "Preferences over Inflation and Unemployment: Evidence from Surveys of Happiness," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 335-341, March.
  7. William D. Nordhaus, 1989. "Alternative Approaches to the Political Business Cycle," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 927, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  8. Rogoff, Kenneth & Sibert, Anne, 1988. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(1), pages 1-16, January.
  9. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135.
  10. S. Brock Blomberg & Jeffry Frieden & Ernesto Stein, 2005. "Sustaining fixed rates: The political economy of currency pegs in Latin America," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 0, pages 203-225, November.
  11. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
  12. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1973. "Some International Evidence on Output-Inflation Tradeoffs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 326-34, June.
  13. Lindbeck, Assar, 1976. "Stabilization Policy in Open Economies with Endogenous Politicians," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 1-19, May.
  14. Bruno S. Frey, 1978. "Keynesian Thinking in Politico-Economic Models," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 1(1), pages 71-81, October.
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  16. L. Wade, 1988. "Review," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 99-100, July.
  17. Ernesto H. Stein & Jorge M. Streb, 1999. "Elections and the Timing of Devaluations," Research Department Publications 4164, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  18. Nordhaus, William D, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 169-90, April.
  19. Shi, Min & Svensson, Jakob, 2002. "Conditional Political Budget Cycles," CEPR Discussion Papers 3352, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  20. Sargent, Thomas J & Wallace, Neil, 1975. ""Rational" Expectations, the Optimal Monetary Instrument, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(2), pages 241-54, April.
  21. Jorge M. Streb, 1999. "Reelection or term limits? The short and the long view of economic policy," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 144, Universidad del CEMA.
  22. Milton Friedman, 1961. "The Lag in Effect of Monetary Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 69, pages 447.
  23. Allan Drazen, 2001. "The Political Business Cycle After 25 Years," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, Volume 15, pages 75-138 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  24. Heinz Welsch, 2007. "Macroeconomics and life satisfaction: Revisiting the "misery index"," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 0, pages 237-251, November.
  25. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  26. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
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Cited by:
  1. Daniel Lema & Jorge M. Streb, 2013. "Ciclos electorales en política fiscal," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 514, Universidad del CEMA.

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