Reelection or term limits? The short and the long run view of economic policy
Abstract
An incumbent's drive for reelection can lead to political budget cycles. The distortion cycles cause in economic policy may be offset by the information they indirectly provide about the incumbent's competency. The informative content of cycles depends on the sophistication of voters, i.e. on whether they are rational or near rational. In a framework of individual candidates, constitutional clauses that prohibit the reelection of the president eliminate political budget cycles. One-term limits that allow non-immediate reelection also shift the focus from short-run cycles to the long-run soundness of economic policies, and have superior welfare properties. Hence, the choice is not reelection or not, but rather immediate or non-immediate reelection.Download Info
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.Bibliographic Info
Article provided by University of Chile, Department of Economics in its journal Estudios de Economia.
Volume (Year): 26 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 Year 1999 (December)
Pages: 187-206
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.econ.uchile.cl/
More information through EDIRC
Related research
Keywords: Reelection; economic policy.;References
No references listed on IDEASYou can help add them by filling out this form.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Jorge M. Streb, 2001. "Signaling in Political Cycles. How far are you willing to go?," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 193, Universidad del CEMA.
- Jorge M. Streb, 2011. "Estabilización económica e incentivos políticos," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 461, Universidad del CEMA.
Lists
This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:udc:esteco:v:26:y:1999:i:2:p:187-206For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Verónica Kunze).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.