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Elections and Exchange Rate Policy Cycles

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Author Info
Marco Bonomo (Graduate School of Economics, Fundação Getulio Vargas)
Cristina Terra (Graduate School of Economics, Fundação Getulio Vargas)

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Abstract

This paper presents a theoretical model based on the distributive effects of RER changes that generates RER electoral cycles of the type identified in Latin American countries: more appreciated RER before elections and more depreciated after elections. Typically, a RER depreciation favors exporters and import competing domestic industries, to the detriment of consumers. These RER cycles are generated by imperfect information on policymakers' preferences, which are concealed from voters with the help of an unstable macroeconomic environment. Exchange rate cycles result from the interplay between the electoral power of the nontradable sector and the tradable sector's ability to lobby the government.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series International Finance with number 0402001.

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Date of creation: 05 Feb 2004
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpif:0402001

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Related research
Keywords: RER cycle electoral cycle distributive conflict

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Kenneth Rogoff & Anne Sibert, 1988. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," NBER Working Papers 1838, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986. "A Positive Theory of Discretionary Policy, the Cost of Democratic Government and the Benefits of a Constitution," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(3), pages 367-88, July.
  3. Kenneth Rogoff, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," NBER Working Papers 2428, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Nordhaus, William D, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(2), pages 169-90, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Laura Alfaro, 1999. "Why governments implement Temporary Stabilization Programs," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 0, pages 211-245, November. [Downloadable!]
  6. Marco Antonio Cesar Bonomo & Maria Cristina Trindade Terra, 1999. "The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policy in Brazil: an Empirical Assessment," Revista Brasileira de Economia, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil), vol. 53(4), April. [Downloadable!]
  7. Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(3), pages 651-78, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Block, Steven A., 2002. "Political business cycles, democratization, and economic reform: the case of Africa," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 205-228, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Piero Ghezzi & Ernesto Stein & Jorge M. Streb, 2000. "Real exchange rate cycles around elections," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 174, Universidad del CEMA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Stein, Ernesto H. & Streb, Jorge M., 1998. "Political stabilization cycles in high-inflation economies," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 159-180, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Marco Antonio Cesar Bonomo & Maria Cristina Trindade Terra, 2005. "Special Interests and Political Business Cycles," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 597, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
  2. Allan Drazen & Marcela Eslava, 2006. "Pork Barrel Cycles," NBER Working Papers 12190, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Marco Antonio Cesar Bonomo & Maria Cristina Trindade Terra, 1999. "The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policy in Brazil: an Empirical Assessment," Revista Brasileira de Economia, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil), vol. 53(4), April. [Downloadable!]
  4. S. Brock Blomberg & Jeffry Frieden & Ernesto Stein, 2005. "Sustaining fixed rates: The political economy of currency pegs in Latin America," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 0, pages 203-225, November. [Downloadable!]
  5. Piero Ghezzi & Ernesto Stein & Jorge M. Streb, 2000. "Real exchange rate cycles around elections," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 174, Universidad del CEMA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Cristina Terra, 2007. "The Political Economy of Exchange Rate in Brazil," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 656, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
  7. Sakurai, Sergio Naruhiko & Menezes, Naercio Aquino, 2008. "Fiscal policy and reelection in Brazilian municipalities," Ibmec Working Papers wpe_115, Ibmec Working Paper, Ibmec São Paulo. [Downloadable!]
  8. Diego Aboal & Fernando Lorenzo & Andrés Rius, 2000. "Is the exchange rate politically manipulated around elections? The evidence from Uruguay," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 1800, Department of Economics - dECON. [Downloadable!]
  9. Marco Bonomo & Cristina Terra, 2008. "Political Business Cycles through Lobbying," THEMA Working Papers 2008-18, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
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