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Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Alberto Alesina
Guido Tabellini
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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number
321307000000000870.
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Date of creation: 14 Mar 2007Date of revision:
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Christian Schultz, 2003.
"Information, Polarization and Delegation in Democracy ,"
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Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1997.
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Persson, T. & Tabellini, G., 1997.
"Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy ,"
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630, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, .
"Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy ,"
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[Downloadable!] Persson, Torsten & Tabellini , Guido, 1997.
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Handbook of Macroeconomics ,
in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 22, pages 1397-1482
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"Bureaucrats or Politicians? ,"
Working Papers
238, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
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Other versions:
Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2003.
"Bureaucrats or Politicians? ,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
2009, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
[Downloadable!] Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2005.
"Bureaucrats or Politicians? ,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
784828000000000638, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Alesina, Alberto F & Tabellini, Guido, 2004.
"Bureaucrats or Politicians? ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4252, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2004.
"Bureaucrats or Politicians? ,"
NBER Working Papers
10241, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 2004.
"Bureaucrats or Politicians? ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH.
[Downloadable!] Stephen Coate & Timothy Besley, 2000.
"Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence ,"
NBER Working Papers
7579, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Besley, Timothy J. & Coate, Stephen, 2000.
"Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory And Evidence ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2381, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 2003.
"Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence ,"
Journal of the European Economic Association ,
MIT Press, vol. 1(5), pages 1176-1206, 09.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2005.
"Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 616-636, June.
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Other versions: Dewatripont, Mathias & Jewitt, Ian & Tirole, Jean, 1999.
"The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 183-98, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Carmine Guerriero, 2008.
"The Political Economy of Incentive Regulation: Theory and Evidence from US States ,"
Working Papers
2008.34, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
[Downloadable!]
Ticchi, Davide & Vindigni, Andrea, 2007.
"War and Endogenous Democracy ,"
Papers
03-10-2008, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy.
[Downloadable!]
Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2007.
"Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part II: Multiple Policy Tasks ,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
321307000000000875, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Acemoglu, Daron & Ticchi, Davide & Vindigni, Andrea, 2008.
"A Theory of Military Dictatorships ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
3392, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Acemoglu, Daron & Ticchi, Davide & Vindigni, Andrea, 2008.
"A theory of military dictatorships ,"
P.O.L.I.S. department's Working Papers
100, Department of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
[Downloadable!] Daron Acemoglu & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2008.
"A Theory of Military Dictatorships ,"
NBER Working Papers
13915, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Daron Acemoglu & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2008.
"A Theory of Military Dictatorships ,"
Carlo Alberto Notebooks
74, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
[Downloadable!] Gersbach, Hans, 2007.
"Vote-share Contracts and Democracy ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6497, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jordi Blanes i Vidal & Clare Leaver, 2008.
"Pandering Judges ,"
Economics Series Working Papers
390, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Paul A. Raschky & Hannelore Weck-Hannemann, .
"Who is going to save us now? Bureaucrats, Politicians and Risky Tasks ,"
Working Papers
2007-29, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
[Downloadable!]
Grischa Perino, 2008.
"How Delegation Improves Commitment ,"
Working Papers
0466, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2008.
[Downloadable!]
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