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Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task

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Alberto Alesina
Guido Tabellini

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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 321307000000000870.

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Date of creation: 14 Mar 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:321307000000000870

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Christian Schultz, 2003. "Information, Polarization and Delegation in Democracy," EPRU Working Paper Series 03-16, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Dewatripont, Mathias & Jewitt, Ian & Tirole, Jean, 1999. "The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 199-217, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 1759, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, . "Bureaucrats or Politicians?," Working Papers 238, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Stephen Coate & Timothy Besley, 2000. "Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 7579, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2005. "Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 616-636, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Dewatripont, Mathias & Jewitt, Ian & Tirole, Jean, 1999. "The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 183-98, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Carmine Guerriero, 2008. "The Political Economy of Incentive Regulation: Theory and Evidence from US States," Working Papers 2008.34, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  2. Ticchi, Davide & Vindigni, Andrea, 2007. "War and Endogenous Democracy," Papers 03-10-2008, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
  3. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2007. "Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part II: Multiple Policy Tasks," Levine's Working Paper Archive 321307000000000875, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Acemoglu, Daron & Ticchi, Davide & Vindigni, Andrea, 2008. "A Theory of Military Dictatorships," IZA Discussion Papers 3392, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Gersbach, Hans, 2007. "Vote-share Contracts and Democracy," CEPR Discussion Papers 6497, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Jordi Blanes i Vidal & Clare Leaver, 2008. "Pandering Judges," Economics Series Working Papers 390, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Paul A. Raschky & Hannelore Weck-Hannemann, . "Who is going to save us now? Bureaucrats, Politicians and Risky Tasks," Working Papers 2007-29, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck. [Downloadable!]
  8. Grischa Perino, 2008. "How Delegation Improves Commitment," Working Papers 0466, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2008. [Downloadable!]
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