This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Information, Polarization and Delegation in Democracy

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Christian Schultz ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper investigates the merits of different democratic institutions when politics is uni-dimensional, there is uncertainty both about the preferences of the future electorate and the future polarization of political parties, and politicians have better information about the state of the world than voters. Three types of institutions are compared: direct democracy, representative democracy, where politicians are accountable and independent agencies, where they are not. Low uncertainty about the state of the world and the future electorate's preferences and high expected polarization make direct democracy optimal, while the opposite configuration makes representative democracy optimal. Independent agencies are optimal for intermediate values.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocCIDL/cesifo1_wp1104.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number CESifo Working Paper No. 1104.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1104

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Poschingerstrasse 5, 81679 Munich
Phone: +49 (89) 9224-0
Fax: +49 (89) 985369
Web page: http://www.cesifo.de

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Julio Saavedra).

Related research
Keywords: accountability; redistribution; constitutional design; voting; information; direct democracy;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Anke Kessler, 2000. "Representative versus Direct Democracy: The Role of Informational Asymmetries," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse18_2000, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 1759, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Schultz, Christian, 1996. "Polarization and Inefficient Policies," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(2), pages 331-44, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1993. "Economic Policy, Economic Performance, and Elections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 27-42, March.
  5. Stephen Coate & Timothy Besley, 2000. "Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 7579, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Matsusaka, John G, 1992. "Economics of Direct Legislation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(2), pages 541-71, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Mailath, George J, 1987. "Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1349-65, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 2004. "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government," Economics Working Papers 0020, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114, February.
    Other versions:
  10. Wilko Letterie & Otto H. Swank, 1998. "Economic Policy, Model Uncertainty and Elections," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 10(1), pages 85-103, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2007. "Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task," Levine's Working Paper Archive 321307000000000870, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2005. "Why do Politicians Delegate?," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000470, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Alesina, Alberto F & Tabellini, Guido, 2004. "Bureaucrats or Politicians?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4252, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2007. "Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part II: Multiple Policy Tasks," Levine's Working Paper Archive 321307000000000875, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Jordi Blanes i Vidal & Clare Leaver, 2008. "Pandering Judges," Economics Series Working Papers 390, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. James E. Alt & David Dreyer Lassen, 2005. "Political and Judicial Checks on Corruption: Evidence from American State Governments," EPRU Working Paper Series 05-12, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can create your own reading lists on IDEAS.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-3.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.