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Voting on the Budget Deficit

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  • Guido Tabellini

    (UCLA)

  • Alberto Alesina

    (Harvard University)

Abstract

This paper analyzes a model in which a group of rational individuals votes over the composition and time profile of public spending. All voters agree that a balanced budget is ex ante optimal. However, if there is disagreement between current and future majorities, a balanced budget is not a political equilibrium under majority rule. Under certain conditions, a majority of the voters favors a budget deficit, and the equilibrium deficit is larger the greater is the polarization among voters. Copyright 1990 by American Economic Association.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Working Papers with number 539.

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Date of creation: 01 Dec 1988
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Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:539

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Web page: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/

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