Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Political Careers or Career Politicians?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Andrea Mattozzi
  • Antonio Merlo

Abstract

Two main career paths are prevalent among politicians in modern democracies: there are career politicians (i.e., politicians who work in the political sector until retirement), and political careers (i.e., there are politicians who leave politics before retirement and work in the private sector). In this paper, we propose a dynamic equilibrium model of the careers of politicians in an environment with a private sector and a political sector, where individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their market ability and political skills. Our analysis provides an explanation for the existence of career politicians and individuals with political careers, and their motivations. We also investigate the effects of monetary incentives and other features of the political-economic environment on the quality of politicians and their careers. We show that an increase in the salary a politician receives while in office decreases the average quality of individuals who become politicians, decreases turnover in office, and may either decrease or increase the average quality of career politicians.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w12921.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 12921.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Feb 2007
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Mattozzi, Andrea & Merlo, Antonio, 2008. "Political careers or career politicians?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 597-608, April.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12921

Note: POL LS
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Phone: 617-868-3900
Email:
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Antonio Merlo & Andrea Mattozzi, 2005. "Political Careers or Career Politicians?," 2005 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 740, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  2. Andrea Prat, 2002. "The wrong kind of transparency," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library 3679, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  3. Cesar Martinelli & Helios Herrera, 2005. "Group Formation and Voter Participation," 2005 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 687, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  4. Persson, Torsten & Roland, Gerard & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1163-1202, November.
  5. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114, February.
  6. Carrillo, Juan D. & Mariotti, Thomas, 2001. "Electoral competition and politician turnover," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 1-25, January.
  7. Ernesto Dal Bo, 2000. "Bribing Voters," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics 39, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  8. Alessandro Gavazza & Alessandro Lizzeri, 2009. "Transparency and Economic Policy," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(3), pages 1023-1048.
  9. Massimo Morelli, 2004. "Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71, pages 829-853, 07.
  10. Michael P. Keane & Antonio Merlo, 2010. "Money, Political Ambition, and the Career Decisions of Politicians," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 186-215, August.
  11. Panu Poutvaara & Tuomas Takalo, 2007. "Candidate quality," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 7-27, February.
  12. Jackson, Matthew O. & Moselle, Boaz, 2002. "Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 49-87, March.
  13. Barry Nalebuff & Ron Shachar, 1999. "Follow the Leader: Theory and Evidence on Political Participation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 525-547, June.
  14. Daniel Diermeier & Michael Keane & Antonio Merlo, 2002. "A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania 04-037, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Sep 2004.
  15. Andrea Mattozzi & Antonio Merlo, 2006. "Mediocracy," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania 07-007, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  16. Caselli, Francesco & Morelli, Massimo, 2000. "Bad Politicians," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 2402, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  17. Bernard Caillaud & Jean Tirole, 2002. "Parties As Political Intermediaries," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 117(4), pages 1453-1489, November.
  18. Ernesto Dal Bo & Pedro Dal Bo & Jason Snyder, . "Political Dynasties," Working Papers, Brown University, Department of Economics 2006-15, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  19. Echenique, Federico & Edlin, Aaron S., 2004. "Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics qt1ht651hk, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
  20. Gilat Levy, 2004. "A model of political parties," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library 540, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  21. Alberto Alesina & Stephen E. Spear, 1987. "An Overlapping Generations Model of Electoral Competition," NBER Working Papers 2354, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  22. Timothy Besley, 2005. "Political Selection," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 19(3), pages 43-60, Summer.
  23. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini , Guido, 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," Seminar Papers, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies 630, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  24. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sundaram, Rangarajan K., 1998. "Optimal Retention in Agency Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 293-323, October.
  25. Harrington, Joseph Jr., 1992. "The role of party reputation in the formation of policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 107-121, October.
  26. Martin J. Osborne & Rabee Tourky, 2008. "Party Formation in Single-Issue Politics," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 974-1005, 09.
  27. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
  28. Robert Barro, 1973. "The control of politicians: An economic model," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 19-42, March.
  29. Messner, Matthias & Polborn, Mattias K., 2004. "Paying politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2423-2445, December.
  30. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2002. "Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661314, December.
  31. Sundadam, R.K. & Banks, J., 1991. "Adverse Selection and Moral hazard in a Repeated Elections Models," RCER Working Papers, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) 283, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  32. Andrea Mattozzi & Antonio Merlo, 2005. "Political Careers or Career Politicians? Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania 07-009, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 07 Feb 2007.
  33. Cecilia Testa, 2004. "Party Polarization and Electoral Accountability," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings, Econometric Society 130, Econometric Society.
  34. Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinksi, 1995. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," Department of Economics Working Papers 1995-01, McMaster University.
  35. Levy, Gilat, 2004. "A model of political parties," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 250-277, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12921. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.