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Credible communication in dynastic government

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  • Roger Lagunoff

    ()
    (Georgetown University)

Abstract

This paper examines the mechanics of intertemporal information provision in dynastic governments.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 28 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: A0

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Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-02aa0006

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  1. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2008. "Communication and Learning," Carlo Alberto Notebooks, Collegio Carlo Alberto 82, Collegio Carlo Alberto, revised 2010.
  2. Krusell, P. & Rios-Rull, J.V., 1993. "Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of Stagnation and Growth," Papers, Stockholm - International Economic Studies 547, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
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  6. Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 2004. "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1034-1054, September.
  7. Kocherlakota, Narayana R., 1996. "Reconsideration-Proofness: A Refinement for Infinite Horizon Time Inconsistency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 33-54, July.
  8. Rubinstein, A., 2000. "Is it "Economics and Psychology"?: the Case of Hyperbolic Discounting," Papers, Tel Aviv 00-21, Tel Aviv.
  9. V. Crawford & J. Sobel, 2010. "Strategic Information Transmission," Levine's Working Paper Archive 544, David K. Levine.
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  12. Martimort, David, 1999. "The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(4), pages 929-47, October.
  13. Tim Besley & Rohini Pande, 1998. "Read my lips: the political economy of information transmission," IFS Working Papers, Institute for Fiscal Studies W98/13, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
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  16. Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1999. "Separation of Regulators Against Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(2), pages 232-262, Summer.
  17. Chari, V V & Kehoe, Patrick J, 1990. "Sustainable Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(4), pages 783-802, August.
  18. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Kahneman, Michael, 1996. "Communication in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 281-297, August.
  19. Harris, Christopher & Laibson, David, 2001. "Dynamic Choices of Hyperbolic Consumers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 935-57, July.
  20. Asheim, G.B., 1996. "Individual and Collective Time-Consistency," Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics 20/1996, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  21. Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, 2001. "Organizations and Overlapping Generations Games: Memory, Communication, and Altruism," Working Papers, Georgetown University, Department of Economics 1, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  22. Battaglini Marco, 2004. "Policy Advice with Imperfectly Informed Experts," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-34, April.
  23. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 327-360, December.
  24. Luca Anderlini & Roger Lagunoff, 2001. " Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games: `Whitewashes' and `Coverups' ," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 0107001, EconWPA.
  25. Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima, 1997. "Private observation and Communication and Collusion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1256, David K. Levine.
  26. Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima, 1998. "Private Observation, Communication and Collusion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 627-652, May.
  27. Dewatripont, Mathias & Jewitt, Ian & Tirole, Jean, 1999. "The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 199-217, January.
  28. Krusell, Per & Quadrini, Vincenzo & Rios-Rull, Jose-Victor, 1997. "Politico-economic equilibrium and economic growth," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 243-272, January.
  29. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
  30. Persson, Torsten & Svensson, Lars E O, 1989. "Why a Stubborn Conservative Would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time-Inconsistent Preferences," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 104(2), pages 325-45, May.
  31. Olivier Compte, 1998. "Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 597-626, May.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Roger Lagunoff, 2004. "The Dynamic Reform of Political Institutions," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings, Econometric Society 47, Econometric Society.
  2. Roger Lagunoff, 2005. "Dynamic Stability and Reform of Political Institutions," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 0505006, EconWPA.
  3. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Politics of Succession," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 0505003, EconWPA.
  4. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2008. "Communication and Learning," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001868, UCLA Department of Economics.
  5. Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000876, UCLA Department of Economics.
  6. Anthony Heyes & Sandeep Kapur, 2012. "Community Pressure for Green Behaviour," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics 1207, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
  7. Egorov, Georgy & Sonin, Konstantin, 2005. "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Non-Democratic Succession," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5092, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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