Private observation and Communication and Collusion
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 1256.
Date of creation: 01 Aug 1997
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- D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1991.
"An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
607, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1991. "An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 26-47, June.
- Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1989. "An Approximative Folk Theorem With Imperfect Private Information," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 525, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Lehrer, Ehud, 1991.
"Internal Correlation in Repeated Games,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer,
Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 431-56.
- Ehud Lehrer, 1988. "Internal Correlation in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 800, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 1997. "Efficiency in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 345-361, October.
- Damme, E.E.C. van & Bhaskar, V., 1997.
"Moral hazard and private monitoring,"
Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
1997-98, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- V. Bhaskar & Eric van Damme, 1998. "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 9809004, EconWPA.
- Bhaskar, V. & Damme, E.E.C. van, 2002. "Moral hazard and private monitoring," Open Access publications from Tilburg University, Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-88790, Tilburg University.
- Radner, Roy, 1986. "Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 43-57, January.
- Lehrer, E, 1989. "Lower Equilibrium Payoffs in Two-Player Repeated Games with Non-observable Actions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 57-89.
- Radner, Roy & Myerson, Roger & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 59-69, January.
- Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima, 1998. "Private Observation, Communication and Collusion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 627-652, May.
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