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Antitrust

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  • Louis Kaplow
  • Carl Shapiro

Abstract

This is a survey of the economic principles that underlie antitrust law and how those principles relate to competition policy. We address four core subject areas: market power, collusion, mergers between competitors, and monopolization. In each area, we select the most relevant portions of current economic knowledge and use that knowledge to critically assess central features of antitrust policy. Our objective is to foster the improvement of legal regimes and also to identify topics where further analytical and empirical exploration would be useful.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 12867.

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Date of creation: Jan 2007
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Publication status: published as Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Antitrust," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12867

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Cited by:
  1. Mikko Packalen, 2011. "Market Share Exclusion," Working Papers, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics 1103, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2011.
  2. Russ Pittman, 2007. "Consumer Surplus as the Appropriate Standard for Antitrust Enforcement," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, Competition Policy International, vol. 3.

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