This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

On Failing to Cooperate When Monitoring Is Private

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Compte, Olivier

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-4576D7R-P/2/12d0546a96e739cac476ef628043cbed
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 102 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 151-188
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:102:y:2002:i:1:p:151-188

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Eiichi Miyagawa & Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2003. "Repeated Games with Observation Costs," Discussion Papers 0203-14, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Christopher Phelan & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2006. "Private monitoring with infinite histories," Staff Report 383, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. William Fuchs, 2005. "Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations," Game Theory and Information 0511007, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. V. Bhaskar & Eric van Damme, 1998. "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring," Game Theory and Information 9809004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. repec:att:wimass:19199818 is not listed on IDEAS
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Want to help out with this project? Look for volunteer opportunities.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-3.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.