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An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Fudenberg, Drew
Levine, David K.
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory .
Volume (Year): 54 (1991)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
Pages: 26-47
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:54:y:1991:i:1:p:26-47Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Radner, Roy, 1986.
"Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting ,"
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Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 1987.
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Econometrica ,
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Lehrer Ehud & Monderer Dov, 1994.
"Discounting versus Averaging in Dynamic Programming ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
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Radner, Roy & Myerson, Roger & Maskin, Eric, 1986.
"An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria ,"
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Lehrer, E, 1990.
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Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994.
"The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information ,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
394, David K. Levine.
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Other versions:
Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994.
"The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information ,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
2058, David K. Levine.
[Downloadable!] Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K. & Maskin, E., 1989.
"The Folk Theorem With Inperfect Public Information ,"
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523, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David I & Maskin, Eric, 1994.
"The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information ,"
Econometrica ,
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[Downloadable!] (restricted) Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984.
"Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information ,"
Econometrica ,
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Other versions: Rubinstein, Ariel & Yaari, Menahem E., 1983.
"Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard ,"
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Ehud Lehrer, 1988.
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Rubinstein, Ariel, 1979.
"Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion ,"
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Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M & Maskin, Eric S, 1990.
"Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players ,"
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Other versions:
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Jee-Hyeong Park, 2000.
"Sustaining Free Trade with Imperfect Private Information about Non-Tariff Barriers ,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
1036, Econometric Society.
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Frank Verboben, 1997.
"Localized Competition, Multimarket Operation and Collusive Behavior ,"
CIG Working Papers
FS IV 97-03, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
[Downloadable!]
Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima, 1997.
"Private observation and Communication and Collusion ,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
1256, David K. Levine.
[Downloadable!]
Rudolf Kerschbamer & Muriel Niederle & Josef Perktold, 2000.
"Market Institutions and Quality Enforcement ,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
1482, Econometric Society.
[Downloadable!]
Verboven, F., 1995.
"Localized Competition, Multimarket Operation and Collusive Behavior ,"
Discussion Paper
49, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Verboven, Frank, 1998.
"Localized Competition, Multimarket Operation, and Collusive Behavior ,"
International Economic Review ,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(2), pages 371-98, May.
Jee-Hyeong Park, 2004.
"Sustaining Free Trade with Imperfect Private Information about Non-Tariff Barriers ,"
Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings
736, Econometric Society.
[Downloadable!]
Mouraviev, Igor, 2006.
"Private Observation, Tacit Collusion and Collusion with Communication ,"
Working Paper Series
672, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
[Downloadable!]
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