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On the Dispensability of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeated Games

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Author Info
Drew Fudenberg
Eric Maskin

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Paper provided by Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics in its series Working papers with number 467.

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Date of creation: Aug 1987
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Handle: RePEc:mit:worpap:467

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  1. Sau-Him Lau & Vai-Lam Mui, 2008. "Using Turn Taking to Mitigate Coordination and Conflict Problems in the Repeated Battle of the Sexes Game," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 65(2), pages 153-183, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Vai-Lam Mui & Sau-Him Paul Lau, 2004. "Achieving Intertemporal Efficiency and Symmetry through Intratemporal Asymmetry: (Eventual) Turn Taking in a Class of Repeated Mixed-Interest Games," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 636, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  3. Jeffery Ely & Johannes Horner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2003. "Strategic Commitment Versus Flexibility in a Duopoloy with Entry and Exit," Discussion Papers 1381, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  4. Barton L. Lipman & Ruqu Wang, 2005. "Switching Costs in Infinitely Repeated Games," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-021, Boston University - Department of Economics, revised Jan 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Jonathan P. Thomas & Martin Cripps, 2000. "Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information," Game Theory and Information 0004003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Dilip Abreu & Prajit K Dutta & Lones Smith, 1997. "Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition," Levine's Working Paper Archive 633, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Jimmy Chan, 2000. "On the Non-Existence of Reputation Effects in Two-Person Infinitely-Repeated Games," Economics Working Paper Archive 441, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  8. Jean-Pierre Benoit & Vijay Krishna, 1996. "The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis," Game Theory and Information 9601001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  9. Jean-Pierre Benoit & Vijay Krishna, 1999. "The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis," Game Theory and Information 9902001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  10. Thomas W.L. Norman, 2006. "Learning to Forgive," Economics Series Working Papers 296, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. George J. Mailath & : Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-027, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 28 Jul 2008. [Downloadable!]
  12. D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1991. "An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 607, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Kevin Hasker, 2007. "Social norms and choice: a weak folk theorem for repeated matching games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 137-146, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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