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Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard

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Author Info
Rubinstein, Ariel
Yaari, Menahem E.
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 30 (1983)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
Pages: 74-97
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:30:y:1983:i:1:p:74-97

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  1. David G. Pearce, 1991. "Repeated Games: Cooperation and Rationality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 983, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  2. Turvey, Calum & Weersink, Alfons, 2005. "Pricing Weather Insurance with a Random Strike Price: An Application to the Ontario Ice Wine Harvest," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19255, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
  3. Luis H. B. Braido, 2003. "Insurance and Incentives in Sharecropping," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  4. Luis H.B. Braido, 2005. "Evidence on the Incentive Properties of Share Contracts," Development and Comp Systems 0508013, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  5. G. Dionne & M. Maurice & J. Pinquet & C. Vanasse, 2001. "The Role of Memory in Long-Term Contracting with Moral Hazard : Empirical Evidence in Automobile Insurance," THEMA Working Papers 2001-11, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2001. "On the MaxMin Value of Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1344, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Jack, William, 2000. "Health insurance reform in four Latin American countries : theory and practice," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2492, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  8. D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1991. "An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 607, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Eric Maskin, 2001. "Roy Radner and Incentive Theory," Economics Working Papers 0004, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
  10. Eslyn Jean Baptiste & Anthony M. Santomero, 1998. "The Design of Private Reinsurance Contracts," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 98-32, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
  11. Dwight Jaffee & Thomas Russell, 1995. "The Causes and Consequences of Rate Regulation in the Auto Insurance Industry," NBER Working Papers 5245, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Oriana Bandiera, 1999. "On the Structure of Tenancy contracts: Theory and Evidence fron 19th Century Rural Sicily," STICERD - Development Economics Papers 19, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Luis H.B. Braido, 2005. "Risk and Insurance in Sharecropping," Risk and Insurance 0508002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  14. Islam, Zahirul & Hoy, Michael & Turvey, Calum, 1999. "The Economics And Implications Of Ex-Ante Regulations In Addressing Problems Of Moral Hazard In Agricultural Insurance," Working Papers 34127, University of Guelph, Department of Food, Agricultural and Resource Economics. [Downloadable!]
  15. Harrison Cheng, 2000. "Folk Theorem with One-sided Information," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 338-363, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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