Social norms, cooperation and inequality
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 30 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- J7 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
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