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Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition

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  • Dilip Abreu
  • Prajit K Dutta
  • Lones Smith

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File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/neu.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 633.

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Date of creation: 01 Aug 1997
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:633

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References

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  1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1979. "Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-9, August.
  2. repec:fth:coluec:565 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. repec:fth:coluec:566 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 1987. "On the Dispensability of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeated Games," Working papers 467, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  5. Smith, Lones, 1992. "Folk theorems in overlapping generations games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 426-449, July.
  6. Abreu, D. & Dutta, P., 1991. "The Folk Theorem for Discounted Repeated Games: A New Condition," RCER Working Papers 299, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  7. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
  8. Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, 2013. "Long Term Competition -- A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 14(2), pages 627-640, November.
  9. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 394, David K. Levine.
  10. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-96, March.
  11. Kandori, Michihiro, 1992. "Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 81-92, January.
  12. Dutta, P.K., 1991. "A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games," RCER Working Papers 293, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  13. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1985. "Finitely Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 905-22, July.
  14. Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January.
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Cited by:
  1. Sambuddha Ghosh & Seungjin Han, 2012. "Repeated Contracting in Decentralised Markets," Department of Economics Working Papers 2012-03, McMaster University, revised May 2013.
  2. David K Levine, 2000. "The Castle on the Hill," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2068, David K. Levine.

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