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Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 53 (1985)
Issue (Month): 5 (September)
Pages: 1173-98
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:53:y:1985:i:5:p:1173-98

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