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Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition

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Author Info

  • Abreu, D.
  • Dutta, P.K.
  • Smith, L.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics in its series Working papers with number 92-15.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 1992
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mit:worpap:92-15

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Postal: MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (MIT), DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, 50 MEMORIAL DRIVE CAMBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS 02142 USA
Phone: (617) 253-3361
Fax: (617) 253-1330
Web page: http://econ-www.mit.edu/
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Postal: MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (MIT), DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, 50 MEMORIAL DRIVE CAMBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS 02142 USA
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Keywords: game theory;

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References

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  1. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1985. "Finitely Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 905-22, July.
  2. repec:fth:coluec:566 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, 2013. "Long Term Competition -- A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 14(2), pages 627-640, November.
  4. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2058, David K. Levine.
  5. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1979. "Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-9, August.
  6. Abreu, D. & Dutta, P., 1991. "The Folk Theorem for Discounted Repeated Games: A New Condition," RCER Working Papers 299, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  7. repec:fth:coluec:565 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
  9. Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January.
  10. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1991. "On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 428-438, April.
  11. Kandori, Michihiro, 1992. "Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 81-92, January.
  12. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-96, March.
  13. Dutta, P.K., 1991. "A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games," RCER Working Papers 293, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  14. Smith, Lones, 1992. "Folk theorems in overlapping generations games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 426-449, July.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Ghosh, Sambuddha & Han, Seungjin, 2012. "Repeated Contracting in Decentralised Markets," Microeconomics.ca working papers, Vancouver School of Economics seungjin_han-2012-12, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 02 May 2013.
  2. David Levine, 2000. "The Castle on the Hill," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 330-337, April.

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