Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games - A Synthesis

Contents:

Author Info

  • Jean-Pierre Benoît

    (New York University)

  • Vijay Krishna

    (Penn State University)

Abstract

We present a synthesis of various folk theorems for repeated games.

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 96-03.

as in new window
Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: Apr 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:9603

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Øster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark
Phone: (+45) 35 32 30 10
Fax: +45 35 32 30 00
Email:
Web page: http://www.econ.ku.dk
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. SORIN, Sylvain, 1988. "Repeated games with complete information," CORE Discussion Papers 1988022, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. John Geanakoplos & Chien-fu Chou, 1988. "The Power of Commitment," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 885, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  3. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
  4. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1991. "On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 428-438, April.
  5. Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, 2013. "Long Term Competition -- A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 14(2), pages 627-640, November.
  6. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, December.
  7. Smith, Lones, 1992. "Folk theorems in overlapping generations games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 426-449, July.
  8. Abreu, Dilip & Dutta, Prajit K & Smith, Lones, 1994. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 939-48, July.
  9. Smith, Lones, 1995. "Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Perfect Finite Horizon Folk Theorem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(2), pages 425-30, March.
  10. Wen, Quan, 1994. "The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 949-54, July.
  11. Bernheim B. Douglas & Dasgupta Aniruddha, 1995. "Repeated Games with Asymptotically Finite Horizons," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 129-152, October.
  12. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
  13. Gossner, Olivier, 1995. "The Folk Theorem for Finitely Repeated Games with Mixed Strategies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 95-107.
  14. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1991. "Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 909-24, July.
  15. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1985. "Finitely Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 905-22, July.
  16. Cremer, Jacques, 1986. "Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 33-49, February.
  17. Radner, Roy, 1980. "Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 136-154, April.
  18. Kandori, Michihiro, 1992. "Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 81-92, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Conconi, Paola & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2005. "Re-election Incentives and the Sustainability of International Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 5401, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Pierre von Mouche & Henk Folmer, 2007. "Linking of Repeated Games. When Does It Lead to More Cooperation and Pareto Improvements?," Working Papers 2007.60, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  3. Gonzalez-Diaz, Julio, 2006. "Finitely repeated games: A generalized Nash folk theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 100-111, April.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:9603. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Hoffmann).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.