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Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring

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  • Contou-Carrère, Pauline
  • Tomala, Tristan
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    Abstract

    Abstract This paper studies finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring played in pure strategies. In these games, each player's action set is endowed with a partition, and the equivalence classes of the actions played are publicly observed. We characterize the limit set of equilibrium payoffs as the duration of the game increases.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

    Volume (Year): 47 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 1 (January)
    Pages: 14-21

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:1:p:14-21

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

    Related research

    Keywords: Finitely repeated games Semi-standard monitoring Folk Theorem;

    References

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    1. Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K. & Maskin, E., 1989. "The Folk Theorem With Inperfect Public Information," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 523, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    2. Lehrer, E, 1989. "Lower Equilibrium Payoffs in Two-Player Repeated Games with Non-observable Actions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 57-89.
    3. Smith, L., 1994. "Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Perfect Finite Horizon Folk Theorem," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 94-17, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    4. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2006. "Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, number 9780195300796, October.
    5. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & Satoru Takahashi, 2004. "Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000865, David K. Levine.
    6. Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1991. "Efficiency and Obsevability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 591, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    7. Tristan Tomala, 1998. "Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 93-109.
    8. Gonzalez-Diaz, Julio, 2006. "Finitely repeated games: A generalized Nash folk theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 100-111, April.
    9. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
    10. Gossner, Olivier, 1995. "The Folk Theorem for Finitely Repeated Games with Mixed Strategies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 95-107.
    11. Lehrer, E, 1990. "Nash Equilibria of n-Player Repeated Games with Semi-standard Information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 191-217.
    12. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1985. "Finitely Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 905-22, July.
    13. George J. Mailath & Steven A. Matthews & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2001. "Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Penn CARESS Working Papers, Penn Economics Department e7304519c6d1562163dbaf181, Penn Economics Department.
    14. Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University 123456789/6103, Paris Dauphine University.
    15. Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2001. "A negative result in finitely repeated games with product monitoring," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 67-70, December.
    16. Renault, Jérôme & Scarlatti, Sergio & Scarsini, Marco, 2008. "Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 44-74, July.
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