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Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

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  • George J. Mailath
  • Steven A. Matthews
  • Tadashi Sekiguchi

Abstract

We present three examples of finitely repeated games with public monitoring that have sequential equilibria in private strategies, i.e., strategies that depend on own past actions as well as public signals. Such private sequential equilibria can have features quite unlike those of the more familiar perfect public equilibria: (i) making a public signal less informative can create Pareto superior equilibrium outcomes; (ii) the equilibrium final-period action profile need not be a stage game equilibrium; and (iii) even if the stage game has a unique correlated (and hence Nash) equilibrium, the first-period action profile need not be a stage game equilibrium.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Penn Economics Department in its series Penn CARESS Working Papers with number e7304519c6d1562163dbaf18101da17e.

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Date of creation: Oct 2001
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Handle: RePEc:cla:penntw:e7304519c6d1562163dbaf18101da17e

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