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Repeated games with complete information

In: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

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Sorin, Sylvain

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Abstract

0. SummaryThe theory of repeated games is concerned with the analysis of behavior in long-term interactions as opposed to one-shot situations; in this framework new objects occur in the form of threats, cooperative plans, signals, etc. that are deeply related to "real life" phenomena like altruism, reputation or cooperation. More precisely, repeated games with complete information, also called supergames, describe situations where a play corresponds to a sequence of plays of the same stage game and where the payoffs are some long-run average of the stage payoffs. Note that unlike general repeated games [see, for example, Mertens, Sorin and Zamir (1992)] the stage game is the same (the state is constant; compare with stochastic games; see the chapter on 'stochastic games' in a forthcoming volume of this Handbook) and known to the players (the state is certain; compare with games of incomplete information, Chapters 5 and 6 in this Handbook).

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This chapter was published in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.) Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, , chapter 04, pages 71-107, 1992.

This item is provided by Elsevier in its series Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications with number 1-04.

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This chapter was published in the following book, which is listed on IDEAS:
R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), 1992. "Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Vai-Lam Mui & Sau-Him Paul Lau, 2004. "Achieving Intertemporal Efficiency and Symmetry through Intratemporal Asymmetry: (Eventual) Turn Taking in a Class of Repeated Mixed-Interest Games," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 636, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  2. Gagen, Michael & Nemoto, Kae, 2006. "Variational optimization of probability measure spaces resolves the chain store paradox," MPRA Paper 4778, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  3. Pavlo Prokopovych & Lones Smith, 2004. "Subgame Perfect Correlated Equilibria in Repeated Games," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 287, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  4. Robert J. Weber, 1985. "Negotiation and Arbitration: A Game-Theoretic Perspective," Discussion Papers 666, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  5. Jean-Pierre Benoit & Vijay Krishna, 1996. "The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis," Game Theory and Information 9601001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  6. Richard T. Boylan & Bente Villadsen, . "A Bellman's Equation for the Study of Income Smoothing," Computing in Economics and Finance 1996 _009, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Jean-Pierre Benoit & Vijay Krishna, 1999. "The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis," Game Theory and Information 9902001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  8. Alejandro Neme & Luis Quintas, 1988. "Equilibrium of Repeated Games With Cost of Implementation," Discussion Papers 763, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  9. John Payne Bigelow, 1996. "Value Oriented Equilibria in Repeated Games of Complete Information," Game Theory and Information 9607003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  10. Harrison Cheng, 2000. "Folk Theorem with One-sided Information," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 338-363, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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