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Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 62 (1994)
Issue (Month): 4 (July)
Pages: 949-54
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:62:y:1994:i:4:p:949-54

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