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Quan Wen

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This is information that was supplied by Quan Wen in registering through RePEc. If you are Quan Wen , you may change this information at the RePEc Author Service. Or if you are not registered and would like to be listed as well, register at the RePEc Author Service. When you register or update your RePEc registration, you may identify the papers and articles you have authored.

Personal Details

First Name: Quan
Middle Name:
Last Name: Wen
Suffix:

RePEc Short-ID: pwe268

Email:
Homepage: http://econ.washington.edu/people/quan-wen/
Postal Address: Department of Economics University of Washington Seattle, WA 98195-3330
Phone:

Affiliation

Department of Economics
University of Washington
Location: Seattle, Washington (United States)
Homepage: http://www.econ.washington.edu/
Email:
Phone:
Fax:
Postal: Box 353330, Seattle, WA 98193-3330
Handle: RePEc:edi:deuwaus (more details at EDIRC)

Works

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Working papers

  1. Houba, H.E.D. & Motchenkova, E. & Wen, Q., 2011. "Antitrust Enforcement and Marginal Deterrence," Discussion Paper 2011-056, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
  2. Katherine Cuff & Sunghoon Hong & Jesse Schwartz & Quan Wen & John Weymark, 2011. "Dominant Strategy Implementation with a Convex Product Space of Valuations," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 1104, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  3. Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova & Quan Wen, 2010. "Competitive Prices as Profit-Maximizing Cartel Prices," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-047/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  4. Houba, H.E.D. & Motchenkova, E. & Wen, Q., 2010. "Antitrust Enforcement Under Endogenous Fines and Price-Dependent Detection Probabilities," Discussion Paper 2010-020, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
  5. Houba, H.E.D. & Motchenkova, E. & Wen, Q., 2009. "The Effects of Leniency on Maximal Cartel Pricing," Discussion Paper 2009-038, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
  6. Jesse A. Schwartz & Quan Wen, 2008. "A Revelation Principle for Dominant Strategy Implementation," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0819, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  7. Houba, H.E.D. & Motchenkova, E. & Wen, Q., 2008. "Maximal Cartel Pricing and Leniency Programs," Discussion Paper 2008-046, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
  8. Harold Houba & Quan Wen, 2007. "Extreme Equilibria in a General Negotiation Model," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-070/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  9. Jesse A. Schwartz & Quan Wen, 2007. "A Subsidized Vickrey Auction for Cost Sharing," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0705, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  10. Sang-Chul Suh & Quan Wen, 2006. "The Eeckhout Condition and the Subgame Perfect Implementation of Stable Matching," 2006 Meeting Papers 176, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  11. Harold Houba & Quan Wen, 2006. "Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model with Different Time Preferences," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0706, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  12. Quan Wen & Jesse A. Schwartz, 2004. "Wage Bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 554, Econometric Society.
  13. Sang-Chul Suh & Quan Wen, 2003. "Multi-Agent Bilateral Bargaining with Endogenous Protocol," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0305, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  14. Sang-Chul Suh & Quan Wen, 2003. "Multi-Agent Bilateral Bargaining and the Nash Bargaining Solution," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0306, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  15. Quan Wen, 2002. "Repeated Games with Asynchronous Moves," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0204, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  16. Taiji Furusawa & Quan Wen, 2001. "Unique Inneficient Perfect Equilibrium in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining with Complete Information," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0121, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  17. Shouyong Shi & Quan Wen, 1994. "Unemployment and the Dynamic Effects of Factor Income Taxation," Working Papers 909, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  18. Busch, L.A. & Wen, Q., 1993. "A Note on Unobservable Mixed Strategies in Negotiation Games," Working Papers 9311, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics.
  19. Busch, L-A. & Wen, Q., 1991. "Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model," University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations Working Papers 9108, University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations.

Articles

  1. Houba, Harold & Motchenkova, Evgenia & Wen, Quan, 2012. "Competitive prices as optimal cartel prices," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 39-42.
  2. Katherine Cuff & Sunghoon Hong & Jesse Schwartz & Quan Wen & John Weymark, 2012. "Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 567-597, July.
  3. Houba, Harold & Wen, Quan, 2011. "Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 507-516.
  4. Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova & Quan Wen, 2010. "Antitrust enforcement with price-dependent fines and detection probabilities," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(3), pages 2017-2027.
  5. Sang-Chul Suh & Quan Wen, 2009. "A multi-agent bilateral bargaining model with endogenous protocol," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 203-226, August.
  6. Harold Houba & Quan Wen, 2008. "On striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 509-519, December.
  7. Aramendia Miguel & Ruiz Luis & Wen Quan, 2008. "Forgiving-Proof Equilibrium in Infinitely Repeated Games," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-17, February.
  8. Sang-Chul Suh & Quan Wen, 2008. "Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 163-174, June.
  9. Jesse A. Schwartz & Quan Wen, 2007. "Wage Negotiation Under Good Faith Bargaining," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(03), pages 551-564.
  10. Suh, Sang-Chul & Wen, Quan, 2006. "Multi-agent bilateral bargaining and the Nash bargaining solution," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 61-73, February.
  11. Houba, Harold & Wen, Quan, 2006. "Different time preferences and non-stationary contracts in negotiations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 273-279, May.
  12. Harold Houba & Quan Wen, 2006. "On The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(3), pages 1-6.
  13. Jesse A. Schwartz & Quan Wen, 2006. "Wage Bargaining Under the National Labor Relations Act," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(4), pages 1017-1039, December.
  14. J. S. Busby & P. W. H. Chung & Q. Wen, 2004. "A situational analysis of how barriers to systemic failure are undermined during accident sequences," Journal of Risk Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 7(7-8), pages 811-826, November.
  15. Takahashi, Satoru & Wen, Quan, 2003. "On asynchronously repeated games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 239-245, May.
  16. Taiji Furusawa & Quan Wen, 2003. "Bargaining with stochastic disagreement payoffs," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 571-591, 09.
  17. Anis, Aslam H. & Benarroch, Michael & Wen, Quan, 2002. "Persistent protection in an international exit game," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 465-487, March.
  18. Furusawa, Taiji & Wen, Quan, 2002. "Disagreement points in trade negotiations," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 133-150, June.
  19. Wen, Quan, 2002. "A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(2), pages 493-512, April.
  20. Quan Wen & Taiji Furusawa, 2001. "Flexibility of disagreement actions in negotiations," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 19-39.
  21. Lutz-Alexander Busch & Quan Wen, 2001. "Finite Horizon Negotiation Games," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 2(2), pages 415-435, November.
  22. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Wen, Quan, 2001. "Negotiation games with unobservable mixed disagreement actions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 563-579, July.
  23. Ling Qiu & Quan Wen, 2000. "Outsiders' threat and consecutive offers," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 663-676.
  24. Shi, Shouyong & Wen, Quan, 1999. "Labor market search and the dynamic effects of taxes and subsidies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 457-495, April.
  25. Ruqu Wang & Quan Wen, 1998. "Strategic Invasion in Markets with Switching Costs," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(4), pages 521-549, December.
  26. Anis, Aslam H. & Wen, Quan, 1998. "Price regulation of pharmaceuticals in Canada," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 21-38, January.
  27. Lutz-Alexander Bush & Shouyong Shi & Quan Wen, 1998. "Bargaining with Surplus Destruction," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(4), pages 915-932, November.
  28. Shi, Shouyong & Wen, Quan, 1997. "Labor market search and capital accumulation: Some analytical results," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1747-1776, August.
  29. Wen, Quan, 1996. "On Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria in Finitely Repeated Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 286-300, April.
  30. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Wen, Quan, 1995. "Perfect Equilibria in Negotiation Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 545-65, May.
  31. Wen, Quan, 1994. "The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 949-54, July.

NEP Fields

14 papers by this author were announced in NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):
  1. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (4) 2006-04-22 2009-01-17 2009-10-31 2011-02-26. Author is listed
  2. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (4) 2009-01-17 2009-10-31 2011-02-26 2012-04-17. Author is listed
  3. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (1) 2007-05-04
  4. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (7) 2004-12-12 2004-12-12 2006-04-22 2007-01-13 2007-05-04 2007-05-04 2008-02-23. Author is listed
  5. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (4) 2009-01-17 2009-10-31 2011-02-26 2012-04-17. Author is listed
  6. NEP-LAB: Labour Economics (2) 2004-10-30 2004-12-12
  7. NEP-LAW: Law & Economics (1) 2009-01-17
  8. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 2009-01-17 2009-10-31
  9. NEP-PBE: Public Economics (1) 2007-05-04
  10. NEP-REG: Regulation (5) 2004-10-30 2004-12-12 2009-01-17 2009-10-31 2012-04-17. Author is listed

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