Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Forgiving-Proof Equilibrium in Infinitely Repeated Games

Contents:

Author Info

  • Aramendia Miguel

    ()
    (Universidad del Pais Vasco)

  • Ruiz Luis

    ()
    (Universidad del Pais Vasco)

  • Wen Quan

    ()
    (Vanderbilt University)

Abstract

In repeated games, equilibrium often requires that any deviation be punished in the continuation, regardless of whether it is beneficial to the other players. It seems against the nature of non-cooperative game theory for the other players to decide what to do based on what one player did, rather than on the well-being of themselves. We introduce a new solution concept called a forgiving-proof equilibrium that recommends continuing as if nothing had happened after a player deviates without harming the others. A folk theorem is established to characterize the set of forgiving-proof equilibrium payoffs when players are sufficiently patient. The concept of forgiving-proof equilibrium significantly reduces the set of equilibrium outcomes in many repeated games.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejte.2008.8.1/bejte.2008.8.1.1440/bejte.2008.8.1.1440.xml?format=INT
Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by De Gruyter in its journal The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 8 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 1-17

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:8:y:2008:i:1:n:5

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.degruyter.com

Order Information:
Web: http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejte

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Kyle Bagwell, 2009. "Self-Enforcing Trade Agreements and Private Information," NBER Working Papers 14812, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:8:y:2008:i:1:n:5. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Golla).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.