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On The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States

Author

Listed:
  • Harold Houba

    (Vrije Universiteit and Tinbergen Institute)

  • Quan Wen

    (Vanderbilt University)

Abstract

Slantchev (2003, American Political Science Review, 97) studies a class of negotiation models to explain costly conflict between two completely informed nations. In one of his main propositions (Proposition 2.3), Slantchev provides a strategy profile to support the so-called extremal subgame perfect equilibrium, where one nation receives its lowest equilibrium payoff. By means of a counter example, we demonstrate the existence of an equilibrium with one nation's payoffs below the strategy profile provided in his Proposition 2.3 (Case 2).

Suggested Citation

  • Harold Houba & Quan Wen, 2006. "On The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(3), pages 1-6.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-05c70039
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fernandez, Raquel & Glazer, Jacob, 1991. "Striking for a Bargain between Two Completely Informed Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 240-252, March.
    2. Slantchev, Branislav L., 2003. "The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 97(1), pages 123-133, February.
    3. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475.
    4. Bolt, Wilko, 1995. "Striking for a Bargain between Two Completely Informed Agents: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1344-1347, December.
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    6. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Wen, Quan, 1995. "Perfect Equilibria in Negotiation Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 545-565, May.
    7. Houba, Harold, 1997. "The policy bargaining model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-27, August.
    8. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1984. "Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1351-1364, November.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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